Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading

In legislatures and committees, a number of issues are voted on separately, leading to an outcome consisting of positions on each of these issues. I investigate the effects this separation of issues has on collective choices, assuming a very abstract collective choice model, whose assumptions are presupposed by many less abstract models, notably spatial models. Assuming the model, if there exists an undominated outcome (one to which no winning coalition prefers any other feasible outcome), it must be chosen in the absence of vote trading, although vote trading can (perversely) lead to a very different outcome. But vote trading does not necessarily lead to a “voting paradox” situation, contrary to several recent papers. The model enables us to define a natural solution concept for the case where every feasible outcome is dominated. Variations on this concept are explored. The effects of weakening the model are investigated.

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Collective Choice

10.1007/978-3-540-24711-1 ◽

2003 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Keyword(s):

Collective Choice

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Graphical Models and Collective Choice

10.21236/ada438432 ◽

2005 ◽

Author(s):

Whitman Richards

Keyword(s):

Graphical Models ◽

Collective Choice

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Expert Communication in Collective Choice Environments

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2258857 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

Keith E. Schnakenberg

Keyword(s):

Collective Choice

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LIBERALISM AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE: A RETURN TO REALITY?

Manchester School ◽

10.1111/j.1467-9957.1978.tb00165.x ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 46 (3) ◽

pp. 224-251 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

CHARLES K. ROWLEY

Keyword(s):

Collective Choice

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Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures

Advances in Complex Systems ◽

10.1142/s0219525998000156 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 01 (02n03) ◽

pp. 221-236 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Diana Richards ◽

Brendan D. McKay ◽

Whitman A. Richards

Keyword(s):

Complex System ◽

Social Choice ◽

Group Decision ◽

Knowledge Structure ◽

Collective Choice ◽

Sense Data ◽

Mutual Knowledge ◽

Interacting Agents ◽

Aggregation Of Information ◽

Domain Independent

The conditions under which the aggregation of information from interacting agents results in a stable or an unstable collective outcome is an important puzzle in the study of complex systems. We show that if a complex system of aggregated choice respects a mutual knowledge structure, then the prospects of a stable collective outcome are considerably improved. Our domain-independent results apply to collective choice ranging from perception, where an interpretation of sense data is made by a collection of perceptual modules, to social choice, where a group decision is made from a set of preferences held by individuals.

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