Risk monitor implementation for the LVR-15 research reactor

2021 ◽  
Vol 208 ◽  
pp. 107403
Author(s):  
D. Ferretto ◽  
G. Mazzini ◽  
W. Ambrosini ◽  
R. Aldorf ◽  
M. Hrehor
2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (9) ◽  
pp. 763-766 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hosein Choopan Dastjerdi ◽  
Hossein Khalafi ◽  
Yaser Kasesaz ◽  
Amir Movafeghi

Kerntechnik ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 72 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 53-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. A. Khater ◽  
S. El-Din El-Morshdy ◽  
M. M. A. Ibrahim

Kerntechnik ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-108
Author(s):  
A. Terekhova ◽  
A. Mahdi ◽  
R. Zykova

Kerntechnik ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 88-97
Author(s):  
D. Zhang ◽  
X. Ran ◽  
Y. Zhang ◽  
H. Zhang

Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Wheeler

This chapter examines the attempts by the first Obama Administration to reach out to Iran in an effort to build trust. It traces the failure of Obama’s diplomatic efforts to secure any reciprocation from Iranian leaders. The lack of reciprocation shows the problem of accurate signal interpretation when there is no trust. It focuses on the negotiations in 2009–10 over limiting Iran’s supply of nuclear fuel in return for refuelling the Tehran Research Reactor. The chapter argues these negotiations failed because of the lack of trust. What makes this case so important is that there was no face-to-face interaction, which this book argues is critical to the development of interpersonal trust and accurate signal interpretation.


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