WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN: EXIT STRATEGIES

After twenty long and frustrating years, America has finally withdrawn completely from Afghanistan. This paper gives an overview of American actions in Afghanistan, starting with the George W. Bush administration and the invasion of American troops, assassination of Osama bin Laden and suppression of Al-Qaeda’s activities, through the Obama administration, during which the ISAF mission ended and throughout which the withdrawal of American troops was announced. After that, an overview of the activities during the mandate of Donald Trump is given, during which definite conditions for the withdrawal of troops were created, by signing the agreement in Doha between the United States of America and the Taliban, which was meant to bring the peace to the Afghanistan. At the end of the paper, an overview of the activities and the situation on the ground during the administration of Joe Biden is given, during which the complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was finally completed, which the Taliban used it to reoccupy the country and declare the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

System Under Strain

Seabed mining became more active as companies invested in technologies to harvest valuable minerals. Momentum toward commercial mining would test directly the idea of international control of ocean space. The industry’s prospects also revived attention to whether the United States might join the Convention, and the Obama administration pushed to secure ratification. That effort failed, mostly because of conservative concerns about the internationalization of the seabed. Washington’s continued refusal to join the Convention created a complicated situation in which the leading maritime power claimed to defend maritime rules but was outside the Convention. From inside the Convention, China and Russia both challenged maritime rules. Both countries rejected international rulings critical of their maritime behavior. Despite an international ruling, China continued its efforts to secure special rights in the South China Sea, and the United States responded by increasing its naval activities in the area and conducting more freedom of navigation operations.

Shifting the US-Myanmar Relations under Trump Administration and its Geopolitical Implication

This paper aims to analyze the shifts in the US-Myanmar relations during Trump administration compared to that of Obama administration, what factors affect such shifts, and how they posit important geopolitical implication. Under Trump administration, the US-Myanmar relations largely revolved around the Rohingya crisis, which shaped the relations between the two nations ‘substantially uncomfortable’. The factors affecting the changing relationship are the temporal dimension of Rohingya crisis, civil-military relations under NLD government, as well as Trump’s ‘American First’ foreign policy, which contributed to the declining of strategic engagement towards Indo-Pacific region where Myanmar is located. This caused an important geopolitical implication: the growing Chinese influence in Myanmar.

The Politics of the President’s Immigration Rhetoric

Although research on immigration politics is extensive, few scholars have systematically connected immigration politics to the president’s rhetoric over time. This is surprising since all modern presidents have referenced immigration in their public statements and presidents play a central role in setting the policy agenda. The primary purpose of this paper is to explain the president’s immigration rhetoric since 1953. Thus, we collect all presidential speeches on immigration through the Obama Administration, calculating the president’s monthly attention to immigration, and the relative negativity of the president’s remarks. We theorize that presidents’ motivation to speak about immigration policy is driven by the attention others devote to immigration policy, and key interventions in the immigration policy debate. Rhetorical tone, we think, is a function of the changing policy definition of immigration generated by Prop 187 and the Post-911 era. Our results show that the content of presidential rhetoric on immigration is indeed a product of these factors, providing us with clear evidence as to when the president devotes public attention to one of the central issues of American politics.

The Obama Administration and the Decision to Surge

Chapter Eleven, “The Obama Administration and the Decision to Surge,” discusses the creation of the 2009 surge strategy as well as the events in Afghanistan during that year.

Continuing Costs: The Impact of Continuing Resolutions on Federal Contracting

Are there unintended consequences from Congress’ use of continuing resolutions (CRs), which are designed as short-term funding to bridge the period before regular appropriations are completed? During a CR, agencies are restricted in their ability to issue contracts, and after the CR ends, agencies may rush to complete their contracting before the fiscal year ends. To expedite contracting, we hypothesize that CRs encourage agencies to use sole-source contracts, rather than on a competitive basis, as well as to use cost-reimbursement contract designs, rather than fixed-price contracts. The Obama Administration found that these contracting practices result in “wasted taxpayer resources, poor contractor performance, and inadequate accountability for results . . .” We anticipate that the longer a CR is in effect, the greater the incentive to use sole-source contracts and cost-reimbursement contract designs. There are implications both for future attempts at contracting reforms, as well as for efforts to establish automatic CRs.

Why did President Obama Not Recognize the Armenian Genocide? Hints from the Obama Administration Memoirs – and Other Sources

Why did President Obama Not Recognize the Armenian Genocide? Hints from the Obama Administration Memoirs – and Other Sources This paper discusses the reasons and processes that led the Obama administration to notrecognize the Armenian Genocide. Although Barack Obama had promised he would doso during his presidential campaign of 2008, he never did once in office, despite many of his administration members, including Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, having strong records in support of such a recognition. To investigate this hitherto poorly explored question, this paper uses primarily — although not exclusively — memoirs written by Barack Obama and members his administration, some of them addressing the issue directly, others dealing with it indirectly. This study focuses on President Obama’s personal choice, and therefore responsibility, to not recognize the genocide, but also expands on the geopolitical determinants of this non-recognition (related mostly to the geostrategic importance of Turkey) as well as on its diplomatic aspects (involving particularly the argument that US recognition would hamper a hypothetical Turkey-Armenia rapprochement). Two episodes of possible presidential recognition of the genocide will be particularly discussed; one in April 2009 (three months after Obama became president of the United States and coinciding with April 24, the anniversary of the genocide), and the other in 2015 (corresponding to its centenary). Finally, stress will be placed on the positions and role of the president’s entourage at the White House, and on his State and Defense Secretaries.