Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games

2004 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 280-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Shachat ◽  
Mark Walker
Games ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 776-794 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sibilla Di Guida ◽  
Giovanna Devetag

Econometrica ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 69 (5) ◽  
pp. 1193-1235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Costa-Gomes ◽  
Vincent P. Crawford ◽  
Bruno Broseta

Author(s):  
Roxana Rădulescu ◽  
Timothy Verstraeten ◽  
Yijie Zhang ◽  
Patrick Mannion ◽  
Diederik M. Roijers ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Bruno Yun ◽  
Srdjan Vesic ◽  
Nir Oren

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.


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