Social science research and child-custody decision making

1992 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Sales ◽  
Rachel Manber ◽  
Linda Rohman
2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bloom ◽  
Laurie Paul

Some decision-making processes are uncomfortable. Many of us do not like to make significant decisions, such as whether to have a child, solely based on social science research. We do not like to choose randomly, even in cases where flipping a coin is plainly the wisest choice. We are often reluctant to defer to another person, even if we believe that the other person is wiser, and have similar reservations about appealing to powerful algorithms. And, while we are comfortable with considering and weighing different options, there is something strange about deciding solely on a purely algorithmic process, even one that takes place in our own heads.What is the source of our discomfort? We do not present a decisive theory here—and, indeed, the authors have clashing views over some of these issues—but we lay out the arguments for two (consistent) explanations. The first is that such impersonal decision-making processes are felt to be a threat to our autonomy. In all of the examples above, it is not you who is making the decision, it is someone or something else. This is to be contrasted with personal decision-making, where, to put it colloquially, you “own” your decision, though of course you may be informed by social science data, recommendations of others, and so on. A second possibility is that such impersonal decision-making processes are not seen as authentic, where authentic decision making is one in which you intentionally and knowledgably choose an option in a way that is “true to yourself.” Such decision making can be particularly important in contexts where one is making a life-changing decision of great import, such as the choice to emigrate, start a family, or embark on a major career change.


1982 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 307
Author(s):  
James D. Cowhig ◽  
Carol H. Weiss ◽  
Michael J. Bucuvalas

2020 ◽  
Vol 101 (7) ◽  
pp. E1225-E1240
Author(s):  
Christopher Nunley ◽  
Kathleen Sherman-Morris

Abstract Recent social science research has provided a better understanding of risk communication and decision-making. However, less is understood about the public’s actual weather knowledge, how they assess their weather knowledge, and how knowledge may relate to weather forecast information use. The objective of this study was to gain a better understanding of self-perceived and assessed weather knowledge of participants. Psychology literature indicates some people are prone to overestimating their knowledge, which is known as the Dunning–Kruger effect (DKE), but this has yet to be studied in a meteorological context. This study compared participants’ assessed weather knowledge with their self-perceived weather knowledge, and results indicate participants with the lowest assessed weather knowledge do overestimate their weather knowledge, a result consistent with previous psychological studies. Participants who obtained a weather forecast more frequently exhibited higher perceived and assessed weather knowledge. Higher perceived and assessed weather knowledge was also observed among users of a specialty weather website compared to a more general audience. The study raises interesting questions about how users of different weather sources acquire or (add to) their weather knowledge and is the first study to explore DKE in the context of weather communication.


Social Forces ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 919
Author(s):  
George H. Conklin ◽  
Carol H. Weiss ◽  
Michael J. Bucuvalas

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document