Did Yeltsin buy elections? The Russian political business cycle, 1993–1999

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames

This article seeks to determine whether a political business cycle existed during Yeltsin's tenure in the Second Russian Republic. While Yeltsin certainly had the power and desire to increase his electoral chances, the lack of state resources and doubts about their appeal to voters presents an inconclusive picture concerning the existence of a political business cycle during this period. Statistical analysis, however, demonstrates that the level of real wage arrears decreased during electoral periods. Other measures, such as federal budget spending or the average monthly pension, only show weak indications of electoral period manipulation. Finally, the usefulness of buying votes in the Russian case, however, is questioned, considering Yeltsin's failures in various Duma elections.

2018 ◽  
pp. 74-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Devesh Kapur ◽  
Milan Vaishnav

In many developing countries, politicians often turn to private firms for illicit election finance. In sectors where firms are highly regulated, politicians can exchange policy discretion or regulatory favours for financial support during elections. This chapter explores this dynamic by focusing on the role of the construction sector in India, a domain where regulatory intensity is high. Specifically, we argue that builders will experience a short-term liquidity crunch as elections approach because of their need to re-route funds to campaigns as a form of indirect election finance. We use variation in the demand for cement, the indispensable ingredient for construction, to investigate the presence of an electoral cycle in building activity consistent with this logic. Using a novel monthly-level dataset, we demonstrate that cement consumption does exhibit a political business cycle supportive of our hypothesis.


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