Killing Politics Softly

Early propaganda studies in authoritarian countries argue that state media works to legitimize the regime through indoctrination and persuasion. However, recent scholarship shows that citizens in authoritarian countries—in states like China, Syria, Russia, and Kazakhstan—can be unconvinced by state propaganda. How, then, does the way in which citizens experience unconvincing propaganda shape their political beliefs? How might unpersuasive propaganda contribute to authoritarian stability? Given the lack of alternative theories of propaganda, this article proposes a new hypothesis based on a reception study that interviewed 24 Russian citizens from Krasnoiarsk Krai after they watched items from Russian state television. The article theorizes that unconvincing state propaganda in Russia can reinforce a preexisting cynical attitude toward politics—an attitude that makes the collective action necessary for bottom-up reform hard to contemplate, let alone organize in an authoritarian context.

Self-Criticism in Post-Communist Times

This article revisits the category of self-criticism, which, as a speech act, plays a special role in the discourse of the intelligentsia, emerging from the peripheral status of Poland and from the imperative to catch up with the West. In contemporary Poland, self-criticism has revived as a discursive strategy in the context of coming to terms with the democratic transformation. For the right-wing intelligentsia, self-criticism is mainly a postulate that is addressed to political adversaries. For the left-liberal intelligentsia, self-criticism is not only a political weapon but also a strategy of introspective enunciation directed at the post-transformation society. A qualitative discourse analysis of selected acts of self-criticism performed by Polish left-liberal elites between 2013 and 2019 highlights two interconnected conflict-generating fields of debate: (1) reckoning with the neoliberal and pro-Western model of the 1989 democratic transition and (2) retribution on the post-transition intellectual elites that patronized the people and the attribution of responsibility for the Elite-People Division. The distinguished functions of self-criticism point to the political and class conflict as well as to the growing delegitimacy of the dominance of the neoliberal narrative about the Polish model of modernization.

Migration and Soft Power

This article explores how Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia view their host country’s government and its influence in Kyrgyzstan, including through the Eurasian Economic Union. Results suggest that migrants have nuanced, pragmatic pro-Russian views. They understand Kyrgyzstan’s dependency on Russia and admire the efficiency of Russia’s government. Yet, they also disapprove of its high levels of corruption and of its disregard for individual rights. Our work contributes to the literature on the diffusion of norms through migration; it also sheds light on Russia’s soft power in Central Asia at a time when rivalry with China is growing in the region.

The Extended Family

After World War II, Polish nobility was commonly considered an obsolete social group because of the post-1945 confiscation of their properties and the decline of their legal and political privileges. From a formal point of view, the Polish nobility had ceased to exist. However, this group did not simply vanish. For this reason, we should not speak of the disintegration of the former noble milieu but rather its reorganization. To expand deliberation on these “reorganization strategies” with the use of appropriate sociological tools, this article analyzes major social actors in contemporary Poland who use their noble legacies in their collective identity-building practices.

The Presence of Maoism in Mexico

During the Cold War, the influence of Maoism as a third way of establishing a new international order inspired several Latin American guerrilla groups, including some in Mexico. This article analyzes the influence of Maoism in Mexico in particular, and pays specific attention to how Florencio Medrano, a peasant leader, was motivated by Maoist thought to establish the Rubén Jaramillo Proletarian Neighborhood, a self-governing neighborhood, and how this site was considered a critical factor for his development as a guerrilla. In the continuing debate over the relationship between agency and structure, the life and work of Florencio Medrano evidences how both social context and personal history influenced his aspirations and demands. By conducting an analysis of primary and secondary sources, this article analyzes some elements of Maoist thought and its diffusion in Latin America in the context of the Cold War. In addition, the article explains the political formation of Florencio Medrano in the Mexican post-revolutionary period, examines Maoist influences on his political formation and participation in pro-communist organizations, and reviews Maoist influence on the organization of the Rubén Jaramillo Neighborhood. Finally, the conclusions emphasize how the peasant origins of Medrano gave rise to his particular understanding of Maoism.

Policing Protest in Russia

As Russia’s post-communist regime descends deeper into authoritarianism, protest politics has become a regular feature of the political landscape. As such, President Putin increasingly faces the “dictator’s dilemma”: How much coercion to deploy against protesters without incurring a social backlash against the regime? That question more generally is now part of analytical consideration in comparative scholarship on social movements and contentious politics. This article contributes to the comparative discussion, first, through an elaboration of an original conceptual typology of protest-policing strategies, applicable to democratic and authoritarian regime types. Second, the article applies this conceptual scheme to Russia to illustrate the variant protest-policing strategies employed during the post-communist period. The research explains how Putin’s authoritarian regime responded to the challenge of the dictator’s dilemma by enacting protest-policing reforms. Inspired by policing trends in the Western democracies, these reforms entail a shift from confrontation-based to containment-based tactics. The article shows variation and adaptation in the way protesters were policed across Russia’s transition from unconsolidated democracy to consolidated authoritarianism. Finally, the article suggests the consequences of protest-policing reform for the ruling regime.

Varieties of Digital Authoritarianism

Digital authoritarianism threatens the privacy and rights of Internet users worldwide, yet scholarship on this topic remains limited in analytical power and case selection. In this article, we introduce a comprehensive analytical framework to the field of Internet governance and apply it first, briefly, to the well-known case of China and then, in more depth, to the still-understudied Russian case. We identify the extent and relative centralization of Internet governance as well as proactive versus reactive approaches to governance as notable differences between the cases, highlighting variation among digital authoritarians’ governance strategies. We conclude that Russia’s Internet governance model is less comprehensive and consistent than China’s, but its components may be more easily exported to other political systems. We then consider whether recent changes to Russia’s Internet governance suggest that it could converge with the Chinese model over time.

Coronavirus Pandemic Response and Voter Choice

Does the public perception of governments’ coronavirus pandemic responses actually make a difference to their electoral fortunes? In this research note, we answer that question by presenting the preliminary results of a survey of more than 3,000 voters in Croatia and Serbia conducted on a dedicated mobile app and web platform directly preceding parliamentary elections that took place in these two countries during the summer of 2020. This survey was part of our larger project tracking political competition, public discourse, and conspiracy theories in Southeast Europe during the coronavirus pandemic. The preliminary findings presented in this research note demonstrate Croatian and Serbian voters were rationally retrospective and rewarded parties in power based on evaluations of their crisis management performance. We also find evidence of voters who have personally witnessed the health consequences of the coronavirus being more likely to support the parties in power. We believe this is evidence of the coronavirus pandemic increasing affected citizens’ expectations of and trust in national governments where those governments respond strongly to the pandemic’s first wave, as was the case in both Croatia and Serbia.

Survival or Crisis? Funding Distribution from Grant-Making Foundations to Grassroots Social Organizations in China

The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake increased the need for disaster relief and reconstruction projects in China. This disaster created an upsurge of Chinese grant-making foundations, which then increased funding expectations. Many grassroots social organizations (SOs) in China believed that going forward, this level of funding would continue. However, the majority of grassroots SOs in China are currently facing an existential crisis. Their survival is being threatened by a shortage of funding from both local and foreign grant-making foundations. This research uses an empirical analysis of grant-making foundations and in-depth interviews, as well as observational evidence accumulated over a 10-year period, to explore the distribution of funding from foundations to grassroots SOs in China. The findings show that there are a limited number of Chinese grant-making foundations and that the foundations that exist do not include grassroots SOs in their funding scheme.

The Political Economy of Autocratization

In competitive authoritarian systems, aspiring autocrats must win elections and marginalize the political opposition. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko’s strategy for political hegemony heavily relied on socioeconomic co-optation, offering privileges to supporters and imposing sanctions on dissenters. In an economy dominated by the state, co-optation had a coercive effect on behavior. Without sizable areas of activity autonomous from the government, citizens could not defy or mitigate the cost of reprisals for openly supporting the political opposition. Through co-optation, Lukashenko weakened the opposition and built an authoritarian regime without resorting to extensive political violence, which could have undermined his claim of public legitimacy.