Countermajoritarian Institutions in Turkish Constitution Making

2020 ◽  
pp. 218-248
Author(s):  
Maria Abad Andrade
Keyword(s):  
Turkish Constitution ◽  
Constitution Making

Democratic constitution-making and unfreezing the Turkish process

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 473-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Arato
Keyword(s):  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Short Article ◽  
The Government ◽  
Turkish Constitution ◽  
Popular Power ◽  
Democratic Constitution ◽  
Strong Claim ◽  
Constitution Making

This short article will seek to explore the causes, and possible solutions, of what seems to be the current freezing of the Turkish constitution-making process that has had some dramatic successes in the 1990s and early 2000s. I make the strong claim that democratic legitimacy or constituent authority should not be reduced either to any mode of power, even popular power, or to mere legality. It is these types of reduction that I find especially troubling in recent Turkish constitutional struggles, where the legal claims of two powers — the government-controlled legislative and the judicial branches — to structure the constitution are not backed by sufficient political legitimacy. In effect these two powers that claim their constituent authorization, rather implausibly in my view, from either the democratic electorate or from an original constituent power, because of their conflict threaten to freeze the constitution-making process that very much needs to be continued and concluded. I end the article by making a suggestion for one possible constitution-making procedure that would be both legitimate and legal.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Corrales
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Large Power ◽  
Power Differential ◽  
Constitution Making

The chapter presents a summary of main findings and discusses their implications. The book’s main finding is that extreme power asymmetry on behalf of the Incumbent creates the conditions for institutional change that empowers mostly the executive branch. A large power differential between the Incumbent and the Opposition encourages the Incumbent to seize the advantage to initiate bold, self-serving institutional change, sometimes even a constitutional overhaul. If the latter gets underway, and power asymmetry stays pro-Incumbent, chances are the new constitution will expand the powers of the Executive branch. This outcome, in turn, can spread discontent across Opposition forces and sometimes encourage the Incumbent to govern more unilaterally. This presents a potential threat to democracy. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of this finding for different literatures: democratization, constitution-making, presidential powers, and government-Opposition relations.

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