Social Rights and the Turkish Constitutional Court

Through a brief examination of the Turkish experience, this article endeavors to illuminate the debate on the role of constitutional courts in interpreting social rights. The Turkish Constitutional Court has in many cases rejected applications for the annulment of legislation related to social rights, on the grounds that it is within the legislature’s discretion to determine public policy priorities based on economic resources and economic stability. This article suggests the Turkish Constitutional Court has narrowly interpreted constitutionally recognized social rights within the boundaries of the Turkish Constitution, with the notable exception of labor rights in individual applications.

Forest fire and law: an analysis of Turkish forest fire legislation based on Food and Agriculture Organization criteria

Background Because of climate and forest vegetation, Turkey has regions (particularly the Mediterranean and Aegean regions) that are vulnerable to forest fires. Approximately 2000 forest fires have occurred every year for the last 20 years, with at least 48% of them caused by humans. This percentage increases to 71% when the rates of fires of unknown causes are included. In this study, legislation on Turkish forest fires was analyzed based on the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’s) guide, “Forest Fires and the Law.” The guide was prepared by expert lawyers and addresses the basic topics of definitions; institutional setup and interinstitutional coordination planning, monitoring, and assessment; prevention and preparedness; detection and early warning and suppression; participatory and community-based approaches to fire management; fire use; rehabilitation; and law enforcement. The objective of this study was to reveal the current status of Turkish forestry legislation and its practices based on the FAO guide. Results According to our analysis, Turkish forestry legislation has followed the FAO criteria 78.1% of the time. It is clear that effective regulations exist, with the Turkish Constitution being the foremost touchstone. The results illustrate that, no matter how strong the legislation is, a deficiency in administrative measures and a lack of public awareness make combating forest fires unsuccessful. Conclusions The areas that need to be improved have been determined to be definitions, participatory and community-based approaches to fire management, and creating a fire line. A focus on public participation and the social approach is needed.

Are Turkey’s Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief Permissible?

This article constitutes a summary of the findings of an inquiry into the utilization of the restriction clause of freedom of religion or belief in the course of restriction of this right in Turkey. It demonstrates that FoRB is restricted in various ways by public authorities which rarely involve a systematic application of the FoRB restriction clause. Despite Turkey’s human rights obligations in the area of freedom of religion or belief and the high status conferred to international human rights law under Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution the impact of international provisions on the protection of FoRB in Turkey remains insufficient and inconsistent. The right to freedom of religion or belief has been restricted through measures based on “established practice”, decisions of public authorities based on laws and regulations not directly dealing with this right and court decisions that are not in full compliance with international law.

Auf dem Weg zum »Präsidialsystem alla Turca?«

In this book, the author examines the development of the Turkish constitution since 1921 in terms of its horizontal separation of powers, and concludes that Turkey’s recent constitutional changes do not imply a presidential system at all. Contrary to the widespread assumption in journalism and academia, the governmental system has persisted in conforming to a parliamentary system. Using a reconceptualisation of the typology of systems of government, this thesis is reinforced and at the same time provides a further contribution to the field of comparative politics by affirming the benefits of the basic dichotomous typology, by elaborating a distinctive subtypification and by rejecting semi-presidentialism as an autonomous type.

Principle of Laicity in Turkish and French Constitutions

To be assumed as a truly democratic state of law; the state should not make law according to a religion and not have a religion-based structure. Turkey and France are two countries different from others being in the discussions on secularism examining the relationship between religion and state. Because the laicity is one of the foundations of the regime and takes part in the legal system as a constitutional principle. In the first chapter the provisions on laicity in the Turkish Constitutions before the date 1982 and in the Turkish Constitution dated 1982 are going to be explained then the discussions in Turkey are going to be evaluated according to the Turkish Constitutional Court's approach to the principle of laicity. In the second part the provisions on the principle of laicity in the French Constitution dated 1958 are going to be explained, afterwards the discussions on laicity in France is going to take place. State and religion relations continue to be relevant a subject. That is why it still gives form to Turkish political life. The freedom of religion and the separation of religious and state relations are the requirements of the laic state. For a state these includes not to have an official religion, be impartial to all the religion and to treat equal to all the believers to different religions, to distinguish the religious institutions and state institutions and not to have an accordance between the rules of and the rules of religion.

A Comparative Perspective on Constitutional Complaint: Discussing Models, Procedures, and Decisions

The constitutional complaint is one of the important constitutional court jurisdictions that can be described as a complaint or lawsuit filed by any person who deems his or her rights has been violating by act or omission of public authority. Currently, the constitutional court in many countries have adopted a constitutional complaint system in a variety of models. However, the first application of the constitutional complaint jurisdiction came from Europe. In Austria, the constitutional complaint is allowed against the administrative actions but not against the court decisions. While Germany and Spain have a similar model that is a complaint against an act of the public authority including court decisions. In Asia, it is imperative that the court in Asia actively participate in the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions (AACC). The AACC members have adopted a system of constitutional adjudication in a variety of models, and when it comes to jurisdictions, out of sixteen AACC members, there are four countries (Azerbaijan, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey) have the constitutional complaint in their jurisdictions. In Azerbaijan, constitutional complaint is comparatively broad. Azerbaijan’s Constitutional Court can handle constitutional complaint against the normative legal act of the legislative and executive, an act of a municipality and the decisions of courts. In contrast, even though constitutional complaint in South Korea and Thailand can be against the exercise and non-exercise of state power, constitutional complaint cannot be filed against court decisions. In Turkey, the constitutional complaint mechanism is coupled with the regional system of human rights protection. The Turkish Constitutional Court handles complaints from individuals concerning violations of human rights and freedoms falling under the joint protection of the Turkish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This paper argues that constitutional complaint represents the main part of the constitutional court, and through a comparative perspective among three countries in Europe and four AACC members are expected to provide lessons for the other AACC members that do not have a constitutional complaint mechanism, such as Indonesia.