Neurological and Cognitive Foundations of GLL

2021 ◽  
pp. 82-106
PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (18) ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie C. Green ◽  
Jeffrey J. Strange ◽  
Timothy C. Brock

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen De Cruz ◽  
Johan De Smedt

This paper examines the cognitive foundations of natural theology: the intuitions that provide the raw materials for religious arguments, and the social context in which they are defended or challenged. We show that the premises on which natural theological arguments are based rely on intuitions that emerge early in development, and that underlie our expectations for everyday situations, e.g., about how causation works, or how design is recognized. In spite of the universality of these intuitions, the cogency of natural theological arguments remains a matter of continued debate. To understand why they are controversial, we draw on social theories of reasoning and argumentation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gil Diesendruck

The tendency to essentialize social groups is universal, and arises early in development. This tendency is associated with negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors, and has thus encouraged the search for remedies for the emergence of essentialism. In this vein, great attention has been devoted to uncovering the cognitive foundations of essentialism. In this chapter, I suggest that attention should also be turned towards the motivational foundations of essentialism. I propose that considerations of power and group identity, but especially a “need to belong”, may encourage children’s essentialization of social groups. Namely, from a young age, children are keen to feel members of a group, and that their membership is secure and exclusive. Essentialism is the conceptual gadget that satisfies these feelings. And to the extent that groups are defined by what they do, this motivated essentialism also impels children to be adamant about the maintenance of unique group behaviors.


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