scholarly journals Transformation of Customary Law Through ICC Practice

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 182-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fausto Pocar

Article 21 of the Rome Statute, in defining the applicable sources of law for the International Criminal Court (ICC), breaks with the practice of the ad hoc tribunals by treating customary international law as only a secondary authority. Nonetheless, customary international law still has an acknowledged role in ICC jurisprudence in filling lacunae in the Rome Statute and aiding in its interpretation. One can also predict other instances in which the application of customary international law will be required. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ICC's use of customary law will lead to that law's further fragmentation or whether that use will instead modify customary law to reflect the ICC Statute.

Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 98 emerged in the context of the debate on grounds to refuse surrender and assistance. The Rome Statute has the potential to conflict with other obligations of States under international law, whether pursuant to customary international law or treaty. In particular, they are required to respect the immunities of diplomats and international officials. States that allow military activity by foreign troops on their territory often have agreements, known as ‘status of forces agreements’ (SOFAs). Article 98 governs these conflicts by, in effect, making obligations of arrest and surrender under the Statute subordinate to other legal norms.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 6 defines the crime of genocide, one of four categories of offence within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The first important ruling on genocide by one of the ad hoc tribunals — the September 2, 1998 judgment of a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Akayesu — was issued several weeks after the adoption of the Rome Statute. Since then there have been several important judicial pronouncements by the Appeals Chambers of the ad hoc tribunals addressing a range of issues relevant to the interpretation of article 6 as well as two judgments of the International Court of Justice. The Court has indicated that the definition of genocide in article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (and therefore article 6 of the Rome Statute) reflects customary law.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 80 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 80 deals with the application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law. The provision was introduced in the final draft, submitted to the Conference early in the day on 17 July 1998, as part of a compromise aimed at calming the objections of a relatively small number of States that had unsuccessfully campaigned to include capital punishment within the range of available penalties in the Rome Statue. Some of these States were concerned that the exclusion of the death penalty would be interpreted as evidence of a growing abolitionist trend internationally and possibly of an emerging norm of customary international law.


Author(s):  
Richard Goldstone

This article discusses contemporary international efforts to consolidate and codify significant portions of existing customary international law. It studies the ad hoc tribunals of the UN and pinpoints the successes and failures of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The ‘completion strategy’ of both international criminal tribunals is discussed. The article also covers the creation of ‘mixed’ courts and a single model for international criminal justice, namely the International Criminal Court.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 28 consists of two paragraphs; the first addressing superior responsibility in a military context, the second dealing with the issue with respect to civilians. Unlike the superior responsibility liability that attaches to military commanders, which was well accepted, application of the concept to civilians proved to be very controversial. Some Trial Chambers at the ad hoc tribunals have referred to article 28 as a basis for the view that the ‘distinction between military commanders and other superiors embodied in the Rome Statute is an instructive one’, although this is a rather isolated opinion. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has acknowledged that whether the liability of civilian superiors ‘contains identical elements to that of military commanders is not clear in customary law’.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 10 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 10 is a rare provision in that it has no title to suggest its content. It is not directed at the application and interpretation of the Rome Statute. Rather, it is intended to guide those who invoke the Rome Statute as an authoritative statement of customary international law, or of general international law. It insulates both the conventional and customary legal obligations of States from claims that these are in some way altered by adoption of the Rome Statute. Article 80 of the Statute has a similar purpose, although it is targeted specifically at capital punishment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ramsden ◽  
Isaac Yeung

The scope and effect of the Head of State immunity doctrine before the International Criminal Court has prompted much discussion following the 2011 decision of the first Pre-Trial Chamber concerning the immunity of serving Sudanese President, Omar Al Bashir. The ptcI held that, as a matter of customary international law, there existed an exception to Head of State immunity where such official is sought by an international court with jurisdiction, here the icc. In an apparent retreat, a differently constituted ptc in 2014 based the inapplicability of such immunity on the terms of Security Council Resolution 1593. Using the 2011 and 2014 ptc decisions as a critical lens, and drawing upon recent material, this article assesses the proper application of Head of State immunity under Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiromi Satō

The International Criminal Court recently presented its arguments concerning criminal responsibility arising pursuant to the theory of ‘control over an organization’. This theory is based on the notion of ‘perpetrator-by-means’ found in the Rome Statute, Article 25(3)a. The court appears to have utilized this theory to establish principal responsibility for ordering in contrast to accessorial responsibility prescribed in Article 25(3)b of the said Statute. However, it should be noted that customary international law has long established the notion of command responsibility lato sensu, recognizing the serious and primary nature of superiors’ responsibility for ordering. This article argues that there should be some conscious sequence between the discussions of ‘control over an organization’ and command responsibility lato sensu for the sake of the integrity of the discourse in international criminal law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document