International Criminal Court and Ad Hoc Tribunals

Author(s):  
Richard Goldstone

This article discusses contemporary international efforts to consolidate and codify significant portions of existing customary international law. It studies the ad hoc tribunals of the UN and pinpoints the successes and failures of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The ‘completion strategy’ of both international criminal tribunals is discussed. The article also covers the creation of ‘mixed’ courts and a single model for international criminal justice, namely the International Criminal Court.

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 491-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONIO CASSESE

AbstractHaving identified the differences between the concept of legality and the much more complex concept of legitimacy, the author scrutinizes the legality and the legitimacy of the existing international criminal tribunals. Their legality has been put in doubt only concerning the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), but the criticisms have been or could be overcome. Assessing the legitimacy of these tribunals is instead a more difficult task. In fact, misgivings have been voiced essentially concerning the legitimacy of the ICTY and the STL, but not the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the other international criminal courts. The legitimacy of the STL in particular deserves to be discussed: even assuming that the STL initially lacked some forms of legitimacy, it could achieve it – or confirm it – through its ‘performance legitimacy’. The author then suggests what the realistic prospects for international criminal justice are. Convinced as he is that it is destined to flourish even more, he tries to identify the paths it is likely to take in future years.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 182-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fausto Pocar

Article 21 of the Rome Statute, in defining the applicable sources of law for the International Criminal Court (ICC), breaks with the practice of the ad hoc tribunals by treating customary international law as only a secondary authority. Nonetheless, customary international law still has an acknowledged role in ICC jurisprudence in filling lacunae in the Rome Statute and aiding in its interpretation. One can also predict other instances in which the application of customary international law will be required. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ICC's use of customary law will lead to that law's further fragmentation or whether that use will instead modify customary law to reflect the ICC Statute.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Garkawe

AbstractThe Statute of the permanent International Criminal Court (the "ICC") agreed to in Rome in 1998 contains many provisions that deal with the specific concerns and rights of victims and survivors of the international crimes that the ICC will have jurisdiction over. It consolidates the work of the two ad hoc international criminal Tribunals (the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) in this area, but also further enhances the role and rights of victims in a number of innovative ways. These three international criminal Tribunals thus collectively represent an important step forward in the recognition of the suffering and the position of victims and survivors of international crimes. This article will examine three main issues in relation to victims and the ICC. First, after identifying the protective measures for victims allowed at the discretion of the international criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, it will focus on the most controversial measure (which the ICC can also order) - the non-disclosure to the defence of the identity of witnesses. Does this protective measure violate a defendant's right to a fair trial? The Statute of the ICC also allows, for the first time in international criminal justice, for the right of victims to obtain their own legal representation, subject to the discretion of the ICC. The second issue is how is this going to work in practice in light of the fact that international crimes normally involve hundreds, if not thousands or even tens of thousands, of victims? And finally, while the ICC Statute provides for the possibility of reparations to victims, where will the money come from, and thus what are the chances of victims actually being able to receive compensation?


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 240-244
Author(s):  
Veronika Bílková

After WWII, countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) actively backed the establishment of the military tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. In the early 1990s, when the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) were created by the UN Security Council, the CEE countries again lent uniform, albeit largely rhetorical support to these institutions. A quarter of a century later, this uniformity seems to be gone. While the CEE countries continue to express belief in international criminal justice, they no longer agree with each other on whether this justice has actually been served by the ad hoctribunals. The diverging views on the achievements of the ICTY and ICTR might also partly account for the differences in the approach to the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), though the grounds for these differences are more complex.


2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Ochoa S.

AbstractThe tension between State sovereignty and the need of international criminal tribunals to have sufficient powers for functioning effectively and independently permeates the provisions on the settlement of disputes contained within the ICC Statute. In contrast to the Statutes and the case-law of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICC Statute gives considerable weight to States Party's sovereignty. In particular, the power of the ICC to settle any dispute concerning its judicial functions under Article 119, paragraph 1, of its Statute is weakened in the area of States Party's cooperation where the provisions of Part 9 of the Statute of that court, in addition to grant those States several possibilities for denying requests for cooperation, remain to a large extent ambiguous as to whether the ICC can scrutinise the grounds for such denials. Yet, it is submitted that the ICC Statute as a whole provides the ICC with sufficient bases to assert such a power. This contribution also casts some light on the relationship between the ICC and States non-party to its Statute from the perspective of the rules on dispute settlement laid down in that international instrument and general international law.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (861) ◽  
pp. 87-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhu Wenqi

Before the International Criminal Court (ICC) came into being, world public attention was focused on issues such as the significance of the Court's establishment, the importance of implementing international criminal justice and the time when the Rome Statute could enter into force. Once the Court was established, attention naturally turned to practical issues, such as whether it would be able to operate normally and perform its historic mission. The question of whether the ICC can operate effectively and perform its mission largely depends on the scope and degree of co-operation provided to it by states. This co-operation concerns not only states party to the ICC but also non-party states. This article offers to explore the obligation of non-party states to co-operate under international law, the prospects of their co-operation and the legal consequences of non-co-operation. The author suggests that beyond the general principle of the law of treaties according to which treaties are binding only on states parties, when viewed in the light of other general principles of international law, co-operation with the ICC is no longer voluntary in nature, but is instead obligatory in the sense of customary international law. Therefore, while a state may not have acceded to the ICC, it may still be subject to an obligation to co-operate with it in certain cases.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 269-272
Author(s):  
Makau Mutua

The International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) is an institution born of necessity after a long and arduous process of many false starts. The struggle to establish a permanent international criminal tribunal stretches back to Nuremberg. The dream, which was especially poignant for the international criminal law community, for a permanent international criminal tribunal was realized with the adoption in 1998 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The treaty entered into force in 2002. Those were heady days for advocates and scholars concerned with curtailing impunity. No one was more ecstatic about the realization of the ICC than civil society actors across the globe, and particularly in Africa, where impunity has been an endemic problem. Victims who had never received justice at home saw an opportunity for vindication abroad. This optimism in the ICC was partially driven by the successes, however mixed, of two prior ad hoc international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 205-208
Author(s):  
Eyal Benvenisti ◽  
Sarah M.H. Nouwen

As a response to the Symposium on the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda published by the American Journal of International Law on the occasion of the tribunals’ closure, this AJIL Unbound Symposium intends to broaden the debate on the “legacies” of those courts. The AJIL Symposium contains articles on the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudential contributions; and their extra-legal impacts and legacies. The concept of “legacy” is itself contested and the appropriateness of the courts’ own efforts to consolidate it may be questioned, especially as they have barely ended (or are about to end) their work. Nevertheless, their over two decades of existence does provide an occasion to assess all they have done and not done, and have affected, intentionally and unintentionally. Against that background, we have invited a group of scholars to respond to the AJIL Symposium and to reflect upon the work of the tribunals with a view to enriching the debate with more voices, from different regions, from different interest groups, and from different disciplines.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document