Special Tribunal for Lebanon and progressive development of international criminal law

The subject. The article analyses the practice of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and its Judgement of 18 August 2020, rendered against those found guilty of a terrorist act and the impact on the progressive development of international criminal law.The purpose. This article seeks to define what goal the international community pursued in establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon from the perspective of international security law, international criminal justice, and counter-terrorism cooperation. The legal nature of the terrorist attack of 14 October 2005 is essential in this regard: is the crime is comparable in its gravity and consequences to the crimes of genocide or war crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, which predetermined the subsequent establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals? Further, was the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon an attempt to make the crimes of terrorism an international crime in practice? Finally, was the establishment of the Tribunal an attempt to lay the groundwork for a new type of international judicial bodies with jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism? The methodology. The authors use such general theoretical and specific scientific methods as comparative analysis, generalization, interpretation and classification as well as systemic analysis and formal logical methods.The main results. The legal qualification and analysis of the circumstances of the terrorist attack do not enable the conclusion that the bomb explosion in Beirut was comparable in danger and consequences to any international crimes or was a threat to international peace and security. In its turn, the involvement of the Security Council in the establishment of the Tribunal does not unequivocally evidence its alleged attempt to create a purely international criminal structure.The choice of applicable law granted to Lebanon and the fact that the crime committed solely affected the interests of that State would qualify the Tribunal as an internationalized judicial body, whose work would focus on defining the crime of terrorism through a broader lens of interpreting national legislation. In other words, the impetus for development has been given not to international but national criminal law.The Tribunal was created neither to progressively develop international criminal law with regard to defining terrorism as an international crime nor to advance the international criminal justice system. Rather, it was an attempt to address Lebanon’s specific political and legal challenges.Conclusions. The outcome of the Tribunal’s work could have a rather negative impact on the development of international criminal law, discrediting the very idea of enabling “peace through justice” and uniform, consistent application and interpretation of international criminal law.

THE WAR AGAINST IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIME: OPTICAL ILLUSION?

Deliberation on the imprescriptibility principle in international criminal law motivates determination towards the principle's function against impunity for international crimes. It is indeed a question of confronting this principle with judicial responsiveness, which relies on the speed of the criminal response. However, the current criminal response seems somewhat poorly considering the arising crimes. The poor execution enables criminals than the victims, which injures society. Therefore, it leads to inadmissibility. It is for this purpose that imprescriptibility arises and imposes itself comfortably. The research's conclusion attempts to demonstrate another facet of imprescriptibility. Imprescriptibility includes the impunity's ineffectiveness which passes irreversibly where ipso facto ensures impunity. This condition was perceived as a temporary and partial absence of justice that produced its socio-legal effects. Thus, the uncertainty of a judicial reaction resulting implicitly from this principle foster indolence in society. Over time, this would unsurprisingly lead to a denial of justice and eternal impunity.

Technique of war crimes regulation in the 1960 Criminal Code of the RSFSR

The article analyses the technique of regulating war crimes in the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1960. The author notes the need for a retrospective analysis of the legislative technique of war crimes in order to consider this type of crime most holistically. Despite the existence of discussions in the theory of criminal law about the concept of legislative technique and the elements included in it, the author interprets legislative technique as a set of means and techniques used to give the content of legislative norms an appropriate form. This article also notes the need to distinguish the category of «war crimes» in the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation, as this term is widespread in international criminal law. The author attributes the following provisions of the Criminal Code to war crimes: Article 356 («Application of prohibited means and methods of warfare»), Article 357 («Genocide») and Article 359 («Menary»). The author conducts a comparative analysis of the legislative technique of the norms on criminal liability for war crimes of the current criminal legislation and criminal legislation of the Soviet period. From the analysis, some features of the technique of regulating war crimes of the Soviet period are revealed, namely: a) most of the elements of war crimes were designed using the casual reception of legislative equipment; b) the Soviet legislator used a direct way of presenting the norms without applying references; c) the note was used to build some formulations of war crimes, but did not This paper also examines a number of imperfections in the technique of regulating war crimes in the 1960 Criminal Code.

Shift from Cultural Property to Cultural Heritage and its Possible Consequences for International Criminal Law

The article examines the content of terms ‘cultural property’ and ’cultural heritage’. It illustrates the continual development in the protection of cultural property that evolved into the concept of cultural heritage. The first part of the article describes differences between the two notions and explains why the term ’cultural heritage’ is more suitable for the current approach to protection of cultural expressions. The second part of the article deals with possible consequences that the conceptual shift from cultural property to cultural heritage can bring to protection under International Criminal Law. It argues that despite the wording of relevant legal documents, it does not explicitly work with the term ’cultural heritage’. The author notes that jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals has already been recognizing this concept and reflecting upon the extent of the term in some of their decisions.