Believable Normative Error Theory

Author(s):  
GERALD K. HARRISON

Abstract Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline five different scenarios in which this is believably the case. I then show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the incompatibility claim. I conclude that believing a proposition is compatible with believing there is no reason to believe it and that as such normative error theory has not yet been shown to be unbelievable.

Author(s):  
Douglas Ehring

This work is about what matters in survival, that is, about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit, common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In this work, it is argued that this Parfitian thesis, revolutionary though it is, does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view, “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns—such as a commitment to find a vaccine for the Covid-19 virus—there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View, and is, in effect, something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.


2017 ◽  
Vol 922 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
G.A. Shekhovtsov ◽  
R.P. Shekhovtsova ◽  
D.P. Ivenin ◽  
O.V. Raskatkina

The article contains the method of discrete scanning points in the vertical plane of the columns and roof trusses for the simultaneous determination of vertical columns, the distance between them in flight at their tip and deflection farms with one point standing and only one performer. The technique is based on the use of reflectorless electronic tachymeter and its SDh key. Experimental research of methods on the elements of building structures NNGASU educational housing using electronic tachymeter SET530R. Results of the experiments were monitored by a coordinate and photographic methods, as well as with the developed at the chair of Engineering Geodesy laser-mirroring device designed to measure inaccessible or hard to reach distances. Analysis methods of error theory position and the results of its comparison with other methods have shown that it provides the required accuracy, easy to perform, does not require the output of the observer on the crane path or lift to the towers, free from the multiple engagement of the bridge crane and can be successfully applied on practice.


Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew

Pettigrew focuses on trade-off objections to epistemic consequentialism. Such objections are similar to familiar objections from ethics where an intuitively wrong action (e.g., killing a healthy patient) leads to a net gain in value (e.g., saving five other patients). The objection to the epistemic consequentialist concerns cases where adopting an intuitively wrong belief leads to a net gain in epistemic value. Pettigrew defends the epistemic consequentialist against such objections by accepting that the unintuitive verdicts of consequentialism are unintuitive, but offering an error theory for why these intuitions do not show the view to be false.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 743-754
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  

I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail.


1984 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-171
Author(s):  
D. Peterson
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 601-629
Author(s):  
Maura Tumulty

Some theories of language, thought, and experience require their adherents to say unpalatable things about human individuals whose capacities for rational activity are seriously diminished. Donald Davidson, for example, takes the interdependence of the concepts of thought and language to entail that thoughts may only be attributed to an individual who is an interpreter of others’ speech. And John McDowell's account of human experience as the involuntary exercise of conceptual capacities can be applied easily only to individuals who make some reasonable judgments, because conceptual capacities are paradigmatically exercised in judgments. In both cases, we seem forced towards an error theory about any ordinary understanding of impaired human individuals as minded, or as undergoing human experience.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaizhong Guo ◽  
Shiyong Liu
Keyword(s):  

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