Desire and Motivation

This chapter introduces the theory ODM (‘Only Desires Motivate’), according to which we can be motivated only by desire. ODM is attractive because it fits with ordinary ways of explaining actions, and because it explains so much—all human behaviour—in a simple and systematic manner. But ODM needs to be distinguished from a nearby more extreme view: although we are only motivated by desire, we are not always motivated by our desires in exact proportion to their strengths. The chapter then shows how ODM can overcome some common-sense objections, can avoid Thomas Nagel’s influential worries, and can make sense of motivation by intention and emotion.

What Matters in Survival

This work is about what matters in survival, that is, about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit, common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In this work, it is argued that this Parfitian thesis, revolutionary though it is, does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view, “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns—such as a commitment to find a vaccine for the Covid-19 virus—there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View, and is, in effect, something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.

A misinterpretation of Keynes’s concept of involuntary unemployment

Research background: One of the principal contributions of Maynard Keynes’s General Theory was identification of the phenomenon of involuntary unemployment, due (on account of adverse expectations and confidence on the part of potential buyers) to a want of demand for the quantity of output which a fully-employed labour force was capable of producing. Such unemployment, he insisted — contrary to conventional opinion — was not due to workers pricing themselves out of work by demanding wages higher than employers could afford. Far from unemployed workers being themselves responsible for their plight, they were, in reality, victims of circumstances beyond their control. Keynes’s understanding was, for many years, widely accepted by academics, policy-makers and the general public. In recent times, however, mainstream macroeconomic theory has shown a regrettable tendency to return to old modes of thinking. Blame for unemployment is again put on the workforce, whose alleged misunderstanding or slow response to change are said to imply seeking employment on unrealistic terms. A more extreme view is that worklessness may reflect a deliberate choice of leisure. To anyone sceptical of the validity of such analyses there is a clear need to recover the Keynesian understanding of the possibility not just of frictional or voluntary, but also of involuntary unemployment. Purpose of the article: Ezra Davar, recognising that it is important not to lose sight of the idea of involuntary unemployment, has recently attempted in this Journal to explain Keynes’s concept. Unfortunately, however, he fails to recognise that Keynes accounted for involuntary unemployment as resulting from deficiency of aggregate demand for output, not as the consequence of any supply-side factor. In attributing involuntary unemployment to a peculiarity in the labour supply function Davar quite misses Keynes’s point, and in fact identifies as involuntary unemployment a situation of what Keynes would have described as “voluntary” employment. The objective of the present note is to clear up this misunderstanding.

Bricolage: A State of Entrepreneurial Excellence

PurposeThe purpose of this conceptual paper is to discuss the concept of bricolage. It defines the term bricolage and its personified form ‘bricoleur’. The paper attempts to identify some measures of bricolage that can assist to relate that concept to either growth of enterprises or their performance. The paper also relates bricoleurs to entrepreneurs. Lastly, the paper asks whether bricoleurs are born or made.Design/Methodology/Approach This is an exploratory paper on a new concept, which should be pursued in more detail in subsequent research. Sources of information are mainly journal articles identified by way of Google scholar. Conclusions point to a promising concept with potential to generate a number of articles on Botswana and surrounding countries.FindingsConceptually defining bricolage as separate from entrepreneurship is feasible, however, discussing related issues, like metrics, becomes fussy and difficult.Practical ImplicationsTaking an extreme view that entrepreneurs, as currently defined, are failing could justify the concept of bricolage. However, common sense might lead one to conclude that, perhaps those failing are not really entrepreneurs. Bricolage can be seen, then as a trait of entrepreneurship.Originality/ ValueThe concept of bricolage is alien to African discourse. When presenting this paper at an African Conference in July 2017, the listeners were alarmed at the attempt to distinguish bricolage from entrepreneurship. Yet there is a wide-ranging debate in the world. These listeners, though experienced researchers in entrepreneurship, dismissed the concept in ignorance. Further research into the concept is justified.

James Angleton and the Church Committee

James J. Angleton, who served as chief of counterintelligence for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1954 to 1974, was an important figure in the Cold War and, in a sense, the first line of defense against clandestine Soviet intelligence operations directed against the United States and its allies. In 1975 a U.S. Senate investigative committee—informally known as the Church Committee and led by Senator Frank Church—called Angleton to testify in public on his approach to counterintelligence, especially how he had become involved in illegal domestic operations in the United States. His testimony to committee staff investigators preceding the hearing, along with his public statements to senators during the hearing, displayed an extreme view of the global Communist threat. Amid ongoing revelations in the mid-1970s of illegal CIA actions, Angleton proved unable to mount an effective public defense of his approach.

An Empirical Test Of The View Of Inventory As A Liability IN Explaining Financial Distress

<span>This study reports a first attempt in a financial distress context to test the extreme JIT and TOC view that inventory is a liability. We compared inventory levels and the change in inventory for healthy and financially distressed manufacturing firms. We also compared the explanatory power of logistic regression models including traditional accounting ratios to that of models including accounting ratios created by viewing inventory as a liability. We found some support for the extreme view of some JIT and TOC proponents that traditional inventory should be considered a liability.</span>

Reason, Interest, Rationality, and Passion in Constitution Drafting

Liberal constitutionalism is founded in part on a desire to build a polity on the basis of reason and the public interest. At its most ambitious, the result can verge on a prepolitical or even apolitical view of constitution writing. To be sure, most liberal constitutionalists have backed away from the extreme view by increasingly recognizing that passion and bargaining will inevitably play a role in constitution writing. But few have moved beyond grudging acceptance of passion and bargaining to active incorporation. In addition, the terms themselves are used in increasingly slippery ways. Yet while greater terminological precision is desirable and possible, it cannot overcome a key feature of constitution drafting: reason and interest are easily confused in practice as are passion and rationality. Even if reason and deliberation over the public interest could be distinguished from passion and private bargaining, they are unlikely to be able to deliver what is demanded of them. Constitutional politics differs from normal politics less in the role for rationality and the public interest and more in the means used and the number of actors with veto power. In such an environment, partisan interest and passion are not merely inevitable contaminants but essential elements.