Banking crises of the Great Depression: a reassessment

2011 ◽  
Vol 66 (5) ◽  
pp. 410-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Stuckler ◽  
Christopher Meissner ◽  
Price Fishback ◽  
Sanjay Basu ◽  
Martin McKee

2007 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 643-671 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Richardson

Weaknesses within the check-clearing system played a hitherto unrecognized role in the banking crises of the Great Depression. Correspondent check-clearing networks were vulnerable to counter-party cascades. Accounting conventions that overstated reserves available to corresponding institutions may have exacerbated the situation. The initial banking panic began when a correspondent network centered in Nashville collapsed, forcing over 100 institutions to suspend operations. As the contraction continued, additional correspondent systems imploded. The vulnerability of correspondent networks is one reason that banks that cleared via correspondents failed at higher rates than other institutions during the Great Depression.


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richhild Moessner ◽  
William A. Allen

We identify similarities and differences in the scale and nature of the banking crises in 2008-9 and the Great Depression, and analyse differences in the policy response to the two crises in light of the prevailing international monetary systems. We find that the scale of the banking crisis, as measured by falls in international short-term indebtedness and total bank deposits, was smaller in 2008-9 than in 1931. However, central bank liquidity provision was larger in the flexible exchange rate environment of 2008-9 than in 1931, when it had been constrained in many countries by the gold standard.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (Suppl 1) ◽  
pp. A6-A7 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Stuckler ◽  
C. Meissner ◽  
P. Fishback ◽  
S. Basu ◽  
M. McKee

1994 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Peter Ferderer ◽  
David A. Zalewski

This article argues that the banking crises and collapse of the international gold standard in the early 1930s contributed to the severity of the Great Depression by increasing interest-rate uncertainty. Two pieces of evidence support this conclusion. First, uncertainty (as measured by the risk premium embedded in the term structure of interest rates) rises during the banking crises and is positively linked to financial-market volatility associated with the breakdown in the gold standard. Second, the risk premium explains a significant proportion of the variation in aggregate investment spending during the Great Depression.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel P. Mathy

There are a multitude of explanations for the depth and length of the Great Depression, of which uncertainty has been proposed as one possible explanation (Romer 1990). The 1930s not only saw extreme declines in output and prices, but stock volatility was also at record highs (Schwert 1989). This high stock volatility was generated by a series of discontinuous jumps as news about uncertainty arrived regularly during the 1930s, as shown by applying the Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) test for jumps in a time-series. To provide a more historical narrative for these jumps, I outline some key events during the Great Depression that generated a sense of uncertainty for businesses and households which occurred contemporaneously to these extreme jumps. While much of the literature has placed Roosevelt's New Deal as a primary source of uncertainty, I do not find much evidence for this hypothesis, and instead find that banking crises, the breakdown of the gold standard, popular unrest and uncertainty related to the brewing war in Europe were primarily responsible for both jumps in returns and the uncertainty of the 1930s.


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