Banking disclosure and banking crises in Africa: does board gender diversity play a role?

The paper aims to investigate the impact of board gender diversity in explaining the relationship between bank disclosure and the predicted probability of banking crises in Africa. The study employs robust panel estimates based on an aggregate dataset of banks in 42 African countries over the 2006–2018 periods. From the study, board gender diversity (more women on boards and the presence of women on boards) has a positive impact on information disclosure of banks. We find that board gender diversity and bank disclosure have the possibility of reducing a banking crisis. We observe that board gender diversity enhances the reductive effect of bank disclosure on a predicted probability of a banking crisis. The implication is that women on boards provide prudent decisions on financial information disclosure that significantly reduce the possibility of a banking crises in order to ensure stable banking systems.

Banking crises and financial instability: Empirical and historical lessons

The paper examines the importance of financial instability for the development of four Norwegian banking crises. The crises are the Post First World War Crisis during the early 1920s, the mid 1920s Monetary Crisis, the Great Depression in the 1930s, and the Scandinavian Banking Crisis of 1987–1993. The paper first offers a description of the financial instability hypothesis applied by Minsky and Kindleberger, and in a recent dynamic financial crisis model. Financial instability is defined as a lack of financial markets and institutions that provide capital and liquidity at a sustainable level under stress. Financial instability basically evolves during times of overheating, overspending and extended credit granting. This is most common during significant booms. The process has devastating effects after markets have turned into a state of negative development.The paper tests the validity of the financial instability hypothesis using a quantitative structural time series model. It reveals upheaval of 10 financial and macroeconomic indicators prior to all the four crises, resulting in a state of economic overheating and asset bubble creation. This is basically explained by huge growth in debts. The overheating caused the following banking crises. Finally, the paper discusses the four crises qualitatively. Again, the conclusion is that a significant increase in money supply and debt caused overheating, asset bubbles, and thereafter, financial and banking crises, which in turn spread to other markets and industries and caused huge slumps in the real economy.

Znajomość zasad gwarantowania depozytów a skłonność do runu na banku

The main goal of the deposit guarantee scheme is to prevent banking panic and consequently to prevent banking crises. The purpose of the article is to check whether the knowledge of depositors about the existence of a deposit guarantee scheme and about the terms of the guarantee affects the propensity to bank run. Thus, the presented study emphasizes that the effectiveness of the deposit guarantee scheme is dependent on the degree of knowledge about the principles of its functioning in society. The results of 200 CATI interviews suggest that this knowledge does not affect the decision to run on a bank, but determines the run type. People with higher knowledge about the principles of deposit guarantee are more likely to make a non-cash form of run (transfer of funds to another bank). For people with less knowledge the cash withdrawal is dominant. Due to the finite cash resources in bank branches, the cash withdrawal form can increase the scale of the run through its mediality.

The Economic Consequences of Banking Crises: The Role of Central Banks and Optimal Independence

A large literature establishes the benefits of central bank independence, yet very few have shown directly negative economic consequences. Furthermore, while prevailing monetary theory suggests CBI should enhance management of economic distress, I argue that independent central banks exhibit tepid responsiveness to banking instability due to a myopic focus on inflation. I show that banking crises produce larger unemployment shocks and credit and stock market contractions when the level of central bank independence is high. Further, I show that these significant economic costs are mitigated when central banks do not have the inflation-centric policy mandates predominantly considered necessary. When the bank has high operational and political independence, banks’ whose policy mandate does not rigidly prioritize inflation produce significantly better outcomes during banking crises. At the same time, I show that this configuration does not produce higher inflation, suggesting it achieves a more flexible design without incurring significant costs.