Corporate governance and initial public offerings in the United Kingdom

Author(s):  
R. Greg Bell
Author(s):  
Salim Chahine ◽  
Igor Filatotchev ◽  
Robert E. Hoskisson ◽  
Jonathan D. Arthurs

This chapter integrates agency research with an institutional perspective and investigates multiple agency conflicts in venture capital (VC) syndicates and their effect on stock-market performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States and the United Kingdom. Using a matched sample of 402 IPOs, the authors show that the size and diversity of a VC syndicate have a negative impact on performance, but this impact is higher in the United States. Ownership concentration within a syndicate improves performance, but this effect is stronger in the United Kingdom. Results indicate that the extent of multiple agency conflicts and their potential remedies are not universal and depend on formal and informal institutions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
SMRK Samarakoon ◽  
KLW Perera

The short-run price performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) indicates that the prices are often underpriced which is widely documented as a universal phenomenon. Corporate governance refers to the set of systems, principles and processes by which a company is governed. Establishing good corporate governance system in an IPO company makes good decisions which attract more outside investors. Therefore, this study examines whether there is any impact of corporate governance practices on short-run price performance of Sri Lankan IPOs. Study examined 44 fixed price IPOs which were listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) during the period of 2003 – January to 2015- December. The study found that Sri Lankan IPOs underprice by 30% on AR, which is statistically significant at 5% level. Further, it found that block holder ownership (ownership concentration), CEO duality and existence of the non-executive directors in the board are positively related to the short-run underpricing, which are statistically significant at 5%. But, the board size has a significant negative impact on underpricing. These relationships are in line with the international literature which confirms that the corporate governance practices have significant impact on short-run price performance of IPOs in Sri Lanka. These findings also support the agency and signaling theories.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 352-362
Author(s):  
Lalith P. Samarakoon ◽  
Palani-Rajan Kadapakkam

We study the relation between initial IPO underpricing and two-tier board structure in the Vienna Stock Exchange of Austria, where a two-tier board is mandatory for listed companies. The board ratio, defined as the size of the supervisory board to the management board, is used to capture the effect of two-tiered board on underpricing. The results show that the board ratio is negatively related with underpricing, consistent with the agency theory which predicts that more effective monitoring implied in a relatively larger supervisory board will lead to lower agency costs, and thus lower underpricing. The results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and suggest that firms seeking to raise external capital will be helped by adopting strong corporate governance standards.


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