Initial public offerings in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 428-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.J. Jenkinson
Author(s):  
Salim Chahine ◽  
Igor Filatotchev ◽  
Robert E. Hoskisson ◽  
Jonathan D. Arthurs

This chapter integrates agency research with an institutional perspective and investigates multiple agency conflicts in venture capital (VC) syndicates and their effect on stock-market performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States and the United Kingdom. Using a matched sample of 402 IPOs, the authors show that the size and diversity of a VC syndicate have a negative impact on performance, but this impact is higher in the United States. Ownership concentration within a syndicate improves performance, but this effect is stronger in the United Kingdom. Results indicate that the extent of multiple agency conflicts and their potential remedies are not universal and depend on formal and informal institutions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 1620-1650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Filatotchev ◽  
Salim Chahine ◽  
Garry D. Bruton

Building on the institutional perspective on capital markets, we examine the process of legitimation that underpins investor valuation of initial public offerings in the context of institutional polycentricism. We focus on the impact of board interlocks of the CEO and internal and external board members on investor perceptions of initial public offering firms in the United States and United Kingdom. We find that the extent of board members’ interlocks relates positively to the extent of the CEO’s interlocks, but this relationship is stronger in the United Kingdom than in the United States. More extensive interlocks lead to higher valuations in the United Kingdom than in the United States. This is the result of differences in institutional confluences that underpin corporate governance in the two culturally related countries.


Firms generally begin as privately owned entities. When they grow large enough, the decision to go public and its consequences are among the most crucial times in a firm’s life cycle. The first time a firm is a reporting issuer gives rise to tremendous responsibilities about disclosing public information and accountability to a wide array of retail shareholders and institutional investors. Initial public offerings (IPOs) offer tremendous opportunities to raise capital. The economic and legal landscape for IPOs has been rapidly evolving across countries. There have been fewer IPOs in the United States in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and associated regulatory reforms that began in 2002. In 1980–2000, an average of 310 firms went public every year, while in 2001–2014 an average of 110 firms went public every year. At the same time, there are so many firms that seek an IPO in China that there has been a massive waiting list of hundreds of firms in recent years. Some countries are promoting small junior stock exchanges to go public early, and even crowdfunding to avoid any prospectus disclosure. Financial regulation of analysts and investment banks has been evolving in ways that drastically impact the economics of going public—in some countries, such as the United States, drastically increasing the minimum size of a company before it can expect to go public. This Handbook not only systematically and comprehensively consolidates a large body of literature on IPOs, but provides a foundation for future debates and inquiry.


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