The demise of moral sentiment theory

Author(s):  
Renee Jeffery
Keyword(s):  
2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThe history of ethics contains many moral faculty theories, which usually are sorted by their metaphysics. The usual suspects include moral rationalism (Richard Price, Kant), moral sentiment theory (Hutcheson, Hume, Smith) and the varieties of ethical naturalism. Moral faculty theories differ importantly upon yet another dimension, on how widely it is distributed. Some, the Platonic elitists (Plato, J.S. Mill, R.M. Hare), suppose that moral truth can be discerned only by philosophical argument. Hence, they ascribe a revisionary task to normative theory, that of correcting nonphilosophers' moral errors. Others, the communalists (Aquinas, Hume, W.D. Ross), hold that the moral faculty is universally distributed. Hence, they hold that normative theory's task is not to revise, but rather to discern and explain the shared moral conception that we all apply in our ordinary moral lives. I here offer arguments to support commonalism.


Emotion ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
David DeSteno ◽  
Monica Y. Bartlett ◽  
Jolie Baumann ◽  
Lisa A. Williams ◽  
Leah Dickens

2019 ◽  
pp. 187-216
Author(s):  
George Pattison

Although it is common to speak of the call of conscience, the specifically linguistic character of this call is frequently occluded in the history of thought. This is clear in the modern history of the idea, in which ideas of moral intuition or moral sentiment predominate, from Cambridge Platonism through to neo-Kantianism. This occlusion is flagged by Gerhard Ebeling, who emphasizes the word-event character of conscience. This is further developed through reference to Emmanuel Levinas and his distinction between Le Dit and Le Dire, and it is contrasted with the seemingly silent ethical demand proposed by K. E. Løgstrup. This difference is interpreted further through a discussion of an incident in writings of the Japanese poet Bashō and the Good Samaritan.


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 528-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANNAH DAWSON

abstractAt the beginning of De jure naturae et gentium (1672), Samuel von Pufendorf proposed a radical dichotomy between nature and morality. He was followed down this arid path by his great admirer John Locke. This article begins by exploring their descriptions of this dichotomy, examining the ways in which human animals were supposed to haul themselves out of the push and pull of the mechanistic world in order to become free moral agents. The article then argues that bubbling up from within this principal account of morality is an alternative account according to which virtue seems to infuse nature, thereby blurring the lines between obligation and motivation, and refiguring the character of moral and political agency. In uncovering this refiguration, I highlight the importance of Aristotelianism and Stoicism for Pufendorf and Locke, suggest continuities rather than breaks between the natural lawyers of the seventeenth century and the theorists of moral sentiment of the next, and gesture towards a hitherto underappreciated discourse in early modern thought: the normativity of nature.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document