Robert Gleave, Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). Pp. 256. $112.00 cloth, $39.95 paper. ISBNs: 9780748625703, 9780748689866

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-409
Author(s):  
Carolyn Baugh
2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-114
Author(s):  
Taymaz G. Tabrizi

This book surveys the development of literal meaning and literalism in Islamand Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) in particular. The term literal meaningrefers to the meaning that a text is believed to hold “in itself” by virtue of thesound-meaning relationships of words that were “coined” (waḍ‘) at some pointin time. Although Muslim debates on how words were coined (see secondchapter) are quite interesting and at times entertaining, the origin of languagewas secondary to the language’s actual existence. In other words, legal theoristscontended that the establishment of the “sound-meaning connection” wasmore important than who established it and when.Literalism, the other focus of the book, is the view that Islamic law privilegesliteral meaning. As Gleave explains in his first chapter, literalism seesliteral meaning as having an “advantage” over allusion, metaphor (majāz),and other kinds of meaning because it holds a “higher level of epistemologicalsecurity” (p. 1). Detecting the author’s intended meaning, although ideal, isfraught with uncertainties for it involves discerning another person’s intentions.In other words, for legal theorists, the literal can be established througha strict science of language and more importantly functions as a “startingpoint” for understanding texts which gives it a central role in hermeneutics.Even if the literal meaning is shown not to be the author’s intended meaning,it is nevertheless essential for controlling and understanding the linguistic andsemantic parameters of a word and the overall text in question.Gleave makes it clear that his purpose is not to establish whether or notthere is such a thing as literal meaning but instead to demonstrate the importanceof its various concepts and the role they played for Muslim legal theoristsof all sects as understanding how a language system works is key to grasping“God’s meaning when he addresses (khiṭāb) his servants” (p. 35). The firsttwo chapters are useful introductions to concepts of literal meaning in legaltheory. The third chapter, where the author traces one of the early conceptsand uses of literal meaning in Qur’anic exegesis, delineates its early historicalemergence in Islamic thought. This is significant for Islamic law and legaltheory as later Muslim legal hermeneutics had “imprints” of the debates thattook place in scriptural exegesis where literal meaning was often identified(e.g., through establishing what a word “literally” meant by tracing its ...


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Ahmed Akgunduz

AbstractIslamic Law is one of the broadest and most comprehensive systems of legislation in the world. It was applied, through various schools of thought, from one end of the Muslim world to the other. It also had a great impact on other nations and cultures. We will focus in this article on values and norms in Islamic law. The value system of Islam is immutable and does not tolerate change over time for the simple fact that human nature does not change. The basic values and needs (which can be called maṣlaḥa) are classified hierarchically into three levels: (1) necessities (Ḍarūriyyāt), (2) convenience (Ḥājiyyāt), and (3) refinements (Kamāliyyāt=Taḥsīniyyāt). In Islamic legal theory (Uṣūl al‐fiqh) the general aim of legislation is to realize values through protecting and guaranteeing their necessities (al-Ḍarūriyyāt) as well as stressing their importance (al‐ Ḥājiyyāt) and their refinements (taḥsīniyyāt).In the second part of this article we will draw attention to Islamic norms. Islam has paid great attention to norms that protect basic values. We cannot explain all the Islamic norms that relate to basic values, but we will classify them categorically. We will focus on four kinds of norms: 1) norms (rules) concerned with belief (I’tiqādiyyāt), 2) norms (rules) concerned with law (ʿAmaliyyāt); 3) general legal norms (Qawā‘id al‐ Kulliyya al‐Fiqhiyya); 4) norms (rules) concerned with ethics (Wijdāniyyāt = Aḵlāqiyyāt = Ādāb = social and moral norms).


2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
Sayed Sikandar Shah ◽  
Mek Wok Mahmud

As an intellectual process, critical thinking plays a dynamic role in reconstructing human thought. In Islamic legal thought, this intellectual tool was pivotal in building a full-fledged jurisprudential system during the golden age of Islamic civilization. With the solidification of the science of Islamic legal theory and the entrenchment of classical Islamic jurisprudence, this process abated somewhat. Recent Islamic revival movements have engendered a great zeal for reinstituting this process. The current state of affairs in constructing and reconstructing Islamic jurisprudence by and large do not, however, reflect the dynamic feature of intellectual thought in this particular discipline. Thus this article attempts to briefly delineate this concept, unveil the reality on the ground, and identify some hands-on strategies for applying critical thinking in contemporary ijtihad.


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