League of Arab States: Communiques from Summit Meetings in Amman and Algiers

1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1646-1659
Author(s):  
Nassib G. Ziadé

At an emergency Arab meeting in Amman, preoccupation with the Arab-Israeli conflict gave way to concern over the Iran-Iraq war. Until then, the permanent emergency of Palestine had been the basic raison d'etre for Arab summitry. But in Amman, the emergency was the Iran-Iraq war. It was shortly after the Amman meeting that the uprising in the occupied territories began. Therefore the Algiers summit meeting, also called “the intifadah (uprising) summit” returned the Palestinian issue to the top to “the Arab agenda and put the Arab-Israeli conflict back at the center of world attention

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-151

The quadrilateral meeting at Aqaba, intended to ““kick off implementation”” of the road map, was attended by King Abdallah, Prime Minister Abbas, Prime Minister Sharon, and President Bush. All four leaders made statements at the end of the meeting, but only those by Abbas and Sharon are reproduced below. President Bush's statement was noteworthy for its mention of Israel as a ““vibrant Jewish state”” (““America is strongly committed and I am strongly committed to Israel's security as a vibrant Jewish state””) and of Palestinian ““hopes”” for a ““viable”” state, and for reiterating that the Arab states ““have promised to cut off assistance and the flow of money and weapons to terrorists groups and to help Prime Minister Abbas rid Palestinian areas of terrorism.”” The statements by Abbas and Sharon were drafted with U.S. officials prior to the meeting. Though Abbas did not comply with the Israeli demand of Palestinian acknowledgment of Israel as a ““Jewish state,”” his speech provoked indignation in the occupied territories for its reference to ““the suffering of the Jews”” without mention of Palestinian suffering, its reiterated call for ending the ““armed intifada,”” and its ““renunciation”” of terrorism. Sharon resisted U.S. suggestions to refer to ““settlements,”” but did mention ““unauthorized outposts.”” In reference to Sharon's mention of ““territorial contiguity”” for a ““viable”” Palestinian state, a spokesman indicated that the contiguity would be ensured by ““bridges and tunnels.”” The text of the statements, transcribed by eMediaMill- Works and carried by the Associated Press, was posted on the Washington Post's Website.


Author(s):  
Gareth Stansfield

This chapter examines the Yom Kippur War of 1973 from a foreign policy perspective. It first provides a background on the Arab–Israeli Conflict that began in 1948 with the War of Independence, followed by the Suez Conflict in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967, and culminated in the Yom Kippur War. It then considers the Egyptian build-up to war in 1973 and why Egypt attacked Israel, as well as the peace process that eventually settled the conflict between the two countries via the Camp David Accords. It also analyses the relative normalization of the Egyptian–Israeli relations and the effective breaking of Egypt’s alliance with other Arab states opposed to the existence of Israel. It concludes with an assessment of the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and the rapprochement between Egypt and Israel.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Galia Golan

The failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict for many years has often been attributed in significant part to the absence of trust in the sincerity of the other side and, more specifically, to the recalcitrant nature of the opponent. Analyses of past proposals and actual negotiations have pointed out missed opportunities, possibly the result of misperceptions or misunderstandings. Recent archival research, publications, and interviews regarding the Israeli protagonists reveal that actual deception, as distinct from ‘misperception’, may have been at play. The article examines this phenomenon as it has appeared since 1967 in six instances of Israeli government dealings with its own public and with the US or the international community, even in recent months, due primarily to an unwillingness to withdraw from the Occupied Territories or agree to enter serious negotiations for ending the conflict with the Palestinians.


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