Jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda over crimes against humanity and genocide

1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (321) ◽  
pp. 651-664
Author(s):  
Marie-Claude Roberge

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were established on 11 February 1993 and 8 November 1994 respectively by the Security Council to prosecute persons responsible for flagrant violations of international humanitarian law. The aim of the Security Council was to put an end to such violations and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, and the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals undoubtedly represents a major step in that direction. Moreover, it sends a clear signal to the perpetrators and to the victims that such conduct will not be tolerated.

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 934-952 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daryl A. Mundis

The international criminal court (ICC) will serve as a permanent institution dedicated to the enforcement of international humanitarian law sixty days after the sixtieth state has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to the Treaty of Rome with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.1 Pursuant to Article 11 of the ICC Statute, however, the ICC will have jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the treaty comes into force.2 Consequently, when faced with allegations of violations of international humanitarian law in the period prior to the establishment of the ICC, the international community has five options if criminal prosecutions are desired.3 First, additional ad hoc international tribunals, similar to those established for the former Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY) and Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR) could be established.4 Second, "mixed" international criminal tribunals, which would share certain attributes with the ad hoc Tribunals, could be created.5 Third, the international community could leave the prosecution of alleged offenders to national authorities, provided that the domestic courts are functioning and able to conduct such trials. Fourth, in those instances where the national infrastructure has collapsed, international resources could be made available to assist with the prosecution of the alleged offenders in domestic courts. Finally, the international community could simply do nothing in the face of alleged violations of international humanitarian law.


Author(s):  
Rafael Nieto-Navia

When the UN Security Council (UNSC) created the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, and Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, it had in mind that the Tribunals were ad hoc and should have a brief life, enough only to bring to justice those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in those countries. In 2010, as a part of the Completion Strategy, the UNSC established the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals as a new ad hoc body, with the purpose of making sure that the Tribunals conclude their missions timely and successfully. The ICTR was officially closed on 31 December 2015. The ICTY will finish its work at the end of 2017. In this article is the analysis of the cases decided by the ICTY in 2015, providing the relevant facts of each case, the reasoning and the decision issued.


1996 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 947-954
Author(s):  
Colin Warbrick ◽  
Dominic McGoldrick ◽  
Colin Warbrick

The Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the Tribunal) by Resolution 827.1 It “determined” that the widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 827 is a Chapter VII resolution. The Council “decided” that all States shall co-operate fully with the Tribunal and its organs and that they shall “take any measures necessary under their domestic law” to give effect to the resolution and obligations which arose under the Statute of the Tribunal.


Author(s):  
Darryl Robinson

SummaryNineteen ninety-seven was marked by several important developments at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. A series of arrests and voluntary surrenders have increased the Tribunal's workload and credibility. The landmark Tadic judgment has clarified international humanitarian law, particularly with respect to crimes against humanity. The Erdemovic decision considered the defence of duress with respect to the murder of civilians and the use ofguilty pleas in international criminal law. Finally, the Blaskic decision has considered the use of subpoenas in international law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 92 (877) ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Barrow

AbstractWhile the Geneva Conventions contain gender-specific provisions, the reality of women's and men's experiences of armed conflict have highlighted gender limitations and conceptual constraints within international humanitarian law. Judgements at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) ad hoc tribunals have gone some way towards expanding the scope of definitions of sexual violence and rape in conflict. More recent developments in public international law, including the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 focused on women, peace and security, have sought to increase the visibility of gender in situations of armed conflict. This paper highlights important developing norms on women, peace and security. Although these norms are significant, they may not be radical enough to expand constructions of gender within international humanitarian law. This leaves existing provisions open to continued scrutiny.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-226
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Szwejkowska

In the last decade of the 20th century, a war in the former Yugoslavia broke out, once again making Europe a witness to an armed conflict. Almost at the same time, another local ethnic bloodshed started, but this time in distant Africa — in Rwanda. Both these events included the most horrifying international crimes against humanity: genocide and war crimes. To prosecute the most important commanding figures involved in these conflicts and hold them criminally responsible, two ad hoc United Nations tribunals were created: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Hague and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha. They finished their operation in 2017 and 2015, respectively. The tasks of conducting and completing all ongoing proceedings, including law enforcement, after the completion of their mandates have been entrusted to the UN International Residual Mechanism. One of the crucial assignments of the tribunals and later the Redisual Mechanism was to deal with the request on behalf of the convicted for granting them early release. Although none of the statutes of the aforementioned courts provided any ground for early release, soon it was accepted that both tribunals, as well as their successor, were entitled to proceed despite this issue. As soon as in 2001, the first convict was granted early release, but with no conditions. It is estimated that, to date, more than 2/3 of all convicted by the Tribunals have been released before the termination of their sentence. This should raise the question of how to rehabilitate that kind of offender, convicted of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, to ensure they do not pose a threat to society anymore. Especially since the offenders serve their punishment outside the country of their origin — meaning, different rules apply according to the domestic law regulation of the state that voluntarily agreed to enforce the sentence. This article analyzes the juridical approach of the tribunals and the Residual Mechanism on the issue of early release of the convicts involved in the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.


2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 827-840
Author(s):  
John Philpot

On November 8,1994, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 955 creating an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to judge individuals responsible for violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. In its form and structure, the Tribunal does not respect basic legal requirements required of a tribunal set up in international law. Us mandate - limited in time, in scope of potential indictment, and in jurisdiction to violations of international humanitarian law - mil prevent any light from being shed on the real issue raised by the Rwandan conflict, namely that of armed military intervention in Rwanda from Uganda. It will likely lead to the reinforcement of a one-sided view of the crisis in Rwanda and legitimate further unilateral interventionist policies in Africa and elsewhere. The Tribunal will institutionalize the de facto impunity for the members and supporters of the present government of Rwanda who undoubtedly committed many serious crimes between October 1, 1990 and the present.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 801-818
Author(s):  
Amanda Alexander

AbstractThis article looks at the development of the concept of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It contends that the ICTR’s interpretation of crimes against humanity is generally seen by international lawyers as a commendable, but unsurprising, step in the historical development of this category. In much the same way, the ICTR’s historical account is considered to be a standard attempt by a war crimes court to relate a liberal history of crimes against humanity in a way that upholds civilized values. Yet, although the historical and legal work of the ICTR appear unexceptional, this article will argue that they do demonstrate a particular conceptual approach towards warfare, history, humanity, and the nature of international law. Moreover, this is a conceptual approach that is quite different to that taken by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The article suggests that these differences, and the invisibility of the change, are due to the ICTR’s reliance on familiar narrative tropes. These narratives were established through poststructuralist theory but could be expressed in a variety of more or (often) less theoretical forms. By exploring the influence of these narratives on the Tribunal, it is possible to examine some of the ways in which conceptual change is facilitated and knowledge is created in international law. In particular, it shows how theories that are often considered marginal to international law have had a significant impact on some of the central provisions of international humanitarian law.


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