Mandatory versus Discretionary Rule Dichotomy in the Harmonization of Corporate Governance Codes: Lessons for Nigeria

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Collins C Ajibo ◽  
Kenneth I Ajibo

AbstractHarmonizing corporate governance systems can potentially level the playing field for businesses, as it would increase financial and economic interconnections, including market integration, between countries. Although harmonization at the regional level such as the EU seems challenging because systems are so diverse, the reverse is the case at the national level. A critical issue in the harmonization effort is whether to adopt the “comply or explain” approach or the mandatory compliance approach. Although mandatory compliance is necessary in certain circumstances, particularly in cases of corporate pseudo-reporting that occasions corporate failures, the predominant approach involves “comply or explain”. Given competing interests in the business community, the inclination for flexibility and the regulatory authority's disposition for an oversight function, this article argues that a hybrid approach should be followed, which will internalize the merits of both the “comply or explain” and mandatory compliance approaches while eschewing their disadvantages.

Author(s):  
Strahinja Miljković ◽  
Damjan Danilović

Social relations, economic development and capital concentration have conditioned the development of legal science in the field of companies. Few legal areas have been so susceptible to legal evolution, especially in the last few decades, where the tendency for permanent changes remains to be seen. Through its development, the company law has expressed its own legal institutes, and the legislature has a number of different legal relationships and facts. In particular, banks with their many personalities are singled out within companies. The credit deposit business conditions specific legal relations, which again affects the creation of a special legal framework. Corporate governance systems are characteristic of the steak-holder approach, which stems from the fact that banks have other people's money, and potential losses are made up of state funds, or budget funds. Banking operations, i.e. the management system thus becomes the public interest. This is especially manifested in the creation of a control framework, in order to preempt the development of systemic risks, which are very emphasized by the banks. These risks may be at both the international and national level, subject to both international and national regulatory control. All this affects a range of personalities in the internal organization of banks, and overall the creation of a special legal framework.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Mangano

Codes of corporate governance and comply or explain approach are always at the core of the European Union agenda. This paper will deal both with the evolution of codes of corporate governance across Europe, and with the 2014 Recommendation. The idea put forwards is that regulators, at both EU and national level, should mainly improve the environment where the comply or explain approach is applied and introduce a system of self-monitoring through online feedbacks only. Arguably, this proposal might offer Member States a light-touch way to comply with Art. 11 of the 2014 Recommendation laying down that “[i]n order to motivate companies to comply with the relevant corporate governance code or to better explain departures from it, efficient monitoring needs to be carried out at national level.”


Author(s):  
Marcello Bianchi ◽  
Angela Ciavarella ◽  
Valerio Novembre ◽  
Rossella Signoretti

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Eulerich ◽  
Carolin van Uum ◽  
Sarah Zipfel

A series of accounting scandals and company failures led to a loss of trust by investors in an organization’s management, which triggered extensive debates regarding Corporate Governance. Eastern European countries require additional regulatory actions due to the privatization programs as a result of the transformation from the planned to market economy. The different corporate governance systems of the individual countries in terms of the monistic one-tier or the dualistic two-tier system resulted in distinctive contents of the corporate governance codes. Despite the differences, all codes have a common objective: to strengthen the confidence of investors through good corporate governance. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the similarities and differences of the Corporate Governance Codes (CGC) in various Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. To do so, the CGCs of Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland are illustrated and compared to the German Corporate Governance Code. On the basis of a broad theoretical model, the national characteristics of the CEE countries are linked to the respective code and the central components are evaluated in detail.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document