scholarly journals Bonus-Driven Repurchases

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingmei Cheng ◽  
Jarrad Harford ◽  
Tianming (Tim) Zhang

AbstractUsing a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO’s bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company’s EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.

2018 ◽  
pp. 2430
Author(s):  
I Kadek Diky Agusnawan ◽  
Dewa Gede Wirama

Announcement of CEO turnover indicates a change in company management in order to improve company performance. The purpose of this study is to test whether the capital market reacts to CEO turnover announcements. This study uses event study method and the sample was selected purposively. The research sample consisted of 79 companies listed in the IDX. Based on the results of the analysis it is found that there are no abnormal returns around the CEO turnover announcement. The results shows that there is no information content in the CEO turnover announcement. The results of this study is consistent with the research of Warner et al., (1998) and Setiawan (2008). The results of the study is not consistent with the research of Weisbach (1988), Kang and Shivdasani (1996), Derment-Ferere and Renneboog (2000), Bahtera (2017). Keywords: Chief executive officer, cumulative abnormal return, market reaction


Author(s):  
Zhaozhao He ◽  
David Hirshleifer

Abstract We propose that chief executive officer (CEO) exploratory mindset (inherent desire to search for novel ideas and long-term orientation) promotes innovation. Firms with CEOs with PhD degrees (PhD CEOs) produce more exploratory patents with greater novelty, generality, and originality. PhD CEOs engage less in managing earnings and stock prices, invest more in research and development (R&D) and alliances, generate higher long-term value of patents, and experience more positive market reactions to R&D alliances. Their firms achieve superior long-run operating performance. They tend to be hired by research-intensive firms with poor financial performance. Evidence from managerial incentive shocks and turnovers suggests that these effects do not derive solely from CEO–firm matching.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-348
Author(s):  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Diane J. Janvrin ◽  
Paul Caster

ABSTRACT In July 2012, Peregrine Financial Group filed for bankruptcy following the discovery that $215 million in customer balances had been embezzled. Investigation revealed that its Chief Executive Officer, Russell Wasendorf, Sr., fooled auditors and regulators for 20 years by preparing fictitious bank statements and cash balance confirmations to hide the theft of cash. The fraud was uncovered when Peregrine's regulator, the National Futures Association (NFA), demanded that Peregrine participate in an electronic confirmation process for verification of customer accounts. This case discusses how the fraud was allowed to go undetected for 20 years, the importance of auditing cash, and how new electronic confirmation technology improves the ability to authenticate confirmation responses. The case is suitable for use in both auditing and accounting information system courses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 406-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Abebe ◽  
Pingshu Li ◽  
Keshab Acharya ◽  
Joshua J. Daspit

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document