Peter van Inwagen Ontology, Identity and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Pp. ix+261. £45 (Hbk). ISBN 0 521791 64 2. £15.95 (Pbk). ISBN 0 521795 48 6.

2003 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-479
Author(s):  
MARK TEXTOR
Keyword(s):  
Cambridge University ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen

Two Arguments from Disagreement

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stoljar
Keyword(s):  
Van Inwagen ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Epistemic Peers ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

This chapter criticizes two disagreement arguments for pessimism. The first, due to David Chalmers, asserts on empirical grounds that there is no large collective convergence to, or agreement on, the truth on the big questions of philosophy. The second, inspired by Peter van Inwagen, asserts that disagreement in philosophy is of a certain special epistemological kind, viz., it rationally requires suspension of judgement, at least in many cases; hence progress is impossible. The existence of ‘epistemic peers’ as a condition of suspension of judgement is discussed. It is suggested that neither argument is persuasive. The chapter ends by asking whether any argument from disagreement may succeed.

A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the cosmological argument

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Quantum Mechanical ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Restricted Version ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Mechanical Phenomena

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.

Can Libertarians Make Promises?

2004 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 217-241
Author(s):  
Alfred Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen

Libertarians hold that free action and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism and that some human beings occasionally act freely and are morally responsible for some of what they do. Can libertarians who know both that they are right and that they are free make sincere promises? Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, contends that they cannot—at least when they assume that should they do what they promise to do, they would do it freely. Probably, this strikes many readers as a surprising thesis for a libertarian to hold. In light of van Inwagen's holding it, the title of his essay—‘Free Will Remains a Mystery’—may seem unsurprising.

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