Pyrrhonism and the Value of Law

The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian (as she/he is described by Sextus Empiricus) considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First (1), we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But (2) Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes (Pyr.) 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians (Math.) 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. (3) The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy.

Experimental Evidence Against Pyrrhonism: Attacking a Straw Man

In a recent article, Mario Attie-Picker maintains that a number of experimental studies provide evidence against Sextus Empiricus's empirical claims about both the connection between belief and anxiety and the connection between suspension of judgement and undisturbedness. In this article, I argue that Sextus escapes unharmed from the challenge raised by the studies in question for the simple reason that he does not make the claims ascribed to him. In other words, I argue that Attie-Picker is attacking a straw man.

Hume is the Enemy of Pyrrho

I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement on all opinions. Hume, by contrast, consistently treats radical suspension of judgement as resulting in despair and social detachment. I take a firmer stance than past commentators on this issue by affirming that Hume and Sextus do not merely disagree on this issue, but that Hume's view is more plausible. Reading Hume's sceptical crisis, I propose, reveals an insightful criticism of Pyrrhonism, one that sheds light on human nature's response to radical doubt.

Sufi Non-Doing Offender Rehabilitation: Positive and Peacemaking Criminology in Practice

Offender rehabilitation is a challenging goal that calls for ongoing creative innovations. Amongst is a non-doing rehabilitative initiation that is inspired by spiritual traditions. The aim of this paper is to present an application of non-doing offender rehabilitation that has no declared intention to rehabilitate, carried by a peacemaking Islamic Sufi route. Based on the positive criminology approach, we conducted a qualitative phenomenological study consisted of interviews with 11 ex-prisoners who were employed in the Shadhiliyya-Yashrutiyya Sufi order as construction workers and also with 35 Sufi disciple and leaders. We identified five themes of non-doing: (1) atmosphere; (2) modeling; (3) social inclusion and suspension of judgement; (4) spiritual meaning; (5) feasibility of transformative processes. The discussion presents principles of a model of non-doing rehabilitation in a spiritual community and emphasizes the research innovation in presenting non-doing as a holistic method of inclusion within a transformative faith community.

Sextus Empiricus on Religious Dogmatism

I present a reading of Sextus Empiricus’ two major discussions of philosophical theology (PH 3. 3–12 and M 9. 14–191) on which they offer divergent but compatible strategies for suspension of judgement about specific theological tenets. In Section 1, I focus on PH 3. 12 and M 9. 49 in order to make the case that the two discussions follow the same philosophical agenda. In Section 2, I argue that Pyrrhonists can participate in religious cult without compromising their suspensive stance. In Section 3, I analyse the argument of PH 3 with an eye to the dogmatic proposals concerning the conception, existence, and providence of god that it targets. In Section 4, I turn to M 9 to show that Sextus relies on dogmatic material to make the case for suspension not only concerning divine existence but also concerning the natural or conventional origin of the concept of god.

ZUM VERHALTNIS VON ATARAXIE UND WAHRHEITSSUCHE BEI SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

This paper concentrates on the relation between two core components in Sextus Empiricus: tranquility and the search for the truth. Against the view of M. Gabriel, who denied the consistency of these elements, I argue that these components can be practiced consistently. I argue that a non-dogmatic concept of investigation could be used by the sceptic to seek the truth and remain tranquil. Positing something as good and evil by nature is revealed as the proper source of anxiety since it causes an intensive longing for the item deemed good. The sceptic refuses to hold the truth for the good through suspension of judgement; as a result, he becomes able to seek the just on the grounds of an internal inclincation.

Exploring Experience as a Myriad Richness: Micro-phenomenology as a Transformative Approach to Research

Over the last twenty years, researches within cognitive sciences has massively grown in the field of the ways of knowing. For instance, in recent years, the paradigm of 4-E cognition suggests that cognition involves the whole body, as well as the situation of the body in the environment. This article argues that a first-person approach enriches the understanding of the ways of knowing in their complexity - particularly by seeking to re-question classical dichotomies - through the re-integration of subjective experience. In the heart of first-person epistemology, the micro-phenomenological interview - based on the explicitation interview - consists in “guided retrospective introspections”, and allows to scientifically access subjective experience. This technique relies on the epoché – the suspension of judgement – a process at first investigated by philosophers that was made accessible to psychology to empirically investigate and study subjective experience. How does the epoché happen? What concrete acts make it up? More broadly, what is the relationship between the epoché and embodiment? This paper sheds lights on possible relations between researches describing concrete practices of the Husserlian epoché and Gendlin’s work concerning the process of Focusing, which aims at accessing the inner felt sense of experience. The process of Focusing, is a way of paying attention to one’s being-in-the-world, one’s interaction as it is experienced through the individual (but not separate) body. We will especially consider the process of “clearing a space” that Gendlin describes, as well as the rupture that occurs during the “bodily felt shift” which can be compared to the conversion happening within the process of epoché. Finally, we discuss how our proposition can allow the construction of new models of knowledge processes, the challenge of such a proposal being not only epistemological, but also ethical and societal. KEYWORDS Subjective experience, embodiment, micro-phenomenology, epoché, focusing.

Conclusion

At the close of Pater’s career, then, one can summarize the broad strokes of his Platonism. He calls it a tendency and a temper; but it is really a critical acuity for negotiating or reconciling the paradox of opposites one sees on a daily basis, such as the many and the one, or the finite in the infinite, the recognition of form in matter, which in the right balance is beauty. Calling it a tendency emphasizes its enduring power in a person’s personality. It is taking seriously the importance of love in Platonism that opens Pater’s teaching up to charges of a peculiar or idiosyncratic form of the philosophy. Platonically, his aestheticism is the desire to possess beauty, and begins with the very things around us, possessing a high degree of form, becoming rarer and rarer, more select, as one learns to identify better instances of it and his taste advances. Because he is a lover and philosopher at once, he progresses up the Platonic ladder with enthusiasm for visible ideas and knowledge of Dialectic, which relies on scepticism, or a suspension of judgement, which is both a suspension of belief and disbelief. Because he becomes ...

Is the Pyrrhonist happy, again? On ἀταραξία and πάθος in Sextus Empiricus.

The article tackles the question whether the Pyrrhonian skeptic can be happy having “pathe” in his life. Thus, the consistency of Pyrrhonian skepticism is discussed. In the first section, I consider the notions of ataraxia and tarache. The source of unhappiness is considered by Sextus to be beliefs about the good and the evil, which give rise to intense longing that creates anxiety. Sceptical suspension of judgement extirpates beliefs and therefore this anxiety. In the second section, the notion of pathe is analyzed in comparison with the Stoics. Pathe, such as hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are inevitably and involuntarily present in the life and they create a certain kind of distress. Because of their unreasonable and necessary nature, pathe cannot be disposed of but are nevertheless moderate and hence bearable. The question is, therefore, whether pathe can cause distress directly or through compelling people to form beliefs, which is examined in the third section. Sextus clearly distinguishes between these things as being dependent (beliefs) and independent (pathe) from us. A presupposition that beliefs are exclusively in our power was widely held at the time. On that ground, I argue that pathe do not originate anxiety for they cannot compel us to form beliefs. In addition, such conditions do not cause great agitation and therefore they cannot be a source of unhappiness. Those who hold something for good or true are burdened with a double distress – mental suffering from beliefs and from pathos. Thus, the skeptical life is better off than the dogmatic one. In the last section, I try to show on example of mental pathe, which are not bodily (the search for truth, love for people, the ethos of the community), that even they do not compel the sceptic to form beliefs.