Why God Thinks what He is Thinking? An Argument against Samuel Newlands’ Brute–Fact–Theory of Divine Ideas in Leibniz’s Metaphysics

According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz’s metaphysics. In this paper, I argue against brute-fact-theories of divine ideas, especially represented by Samuel Newlands in Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility, and elaborate an alternative Leibnizian theory of divine ideas.

Brute Fact

Concerns about contingency are explored further by way of a consideration of brute facts. Facts (ways the universe is) that are explanatorily brute are distinguished from those that are ontologically brute. Explanation, being a product of finite minds, must end somewhere, it would seem, but this leaves open the question whether the universe, or its nature, is in any respect ontologically brute. The difficulty of answering this question is registered and the suggestion advanced that reality, being itself, determines what could or must be the case. This leads to an ontological argument of the form, if there is something, if there is anything at all, there could not have been nothing: nothing comes from nothing. The upshot is something like a metaphysical counterpart to the principle of sufficient reason.

Foundations of Biology

It is often stated that there are no laws in biology, where everything is contingent and could have been otherwise, being solely the result of historical accidents. Furthermore, the customary introduction of fundamental biological entities such as individual organisms, cells, genes, catalysts, and motors remains largely descriptive; constructive approaches involving deductive reasoning appear, in comparison, almost absent. As a consequence, both the logical content and principles of biology need to be reconsidered. The present article describes an inquiry into the foundations of biology. The foundations of biology are built in terms of elements, logic, and principles, using both the language and the general methods employed in other disciplines. This approach assumes the existence of a certain unity of human knowledge that transcends discipline boundaries. Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason is revised through a study of the complementary concepts of symmetry and asymmetry and of necessity and contingency. This is used to explain how these concepts are involved in the elaboration of theories or laws of nature. Four fundamental theories of biology are then identified: cell theory, Darwin’s theory of natural selection, an informational theory of life (which includes Mendel’s theory of inheritance) and a physico-chemical theory of life. Atomism and deductive reasoning are shown to enter into the elaboration of the concepts of natural selection, individual living organisms, cells, and their reproduction, genes, as well as catalysts and motors. This work contributes to clarify the philosophical and logical structure of biology and its major theories. This should ultimately lead to a better understanding of the origin of life, of system and synthetic biology, and of artificial life.

Books and Their Method

This chapter deals with the method of philosophical books during the sixth/twelfth century. It begins with an analysis of Abu l-Barakat al-Baghdadi’s method of i’tibar (careful consideration) and highlights its departure from al-Farabi’s and Avicenna’s (Ibn Sina’s) demonstrative method as the ideal of philosophical inquiry. The chapter looks at how Fakhr al-Din al-Razi describes his own method in his philosophical books and it analyzes the method of “probing and dividing” (sabr wa-taqsim) used therein. Finally, the chapter zooms in on the methodical differences between Fakhr al-Din’s philosophical books and his books of kalam and focuses on the principle of sufficient reason. This philosophical principle requires that every event must have a rational explanation of its cause(s). The principle is universally valid in al-Razi’s philosophical books, yet in his books on kalam only insofar as God’s will is excluded from this requirement. This difference has far-reaching effects on the teachings put forward in these two genres of books.

Leibniz on the Grounds of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

I examine several alleged grounds of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz’s philosophy. These include the nature of a requisite and a sufficient condition, the nature of truth, and the nature of harmony. I argue that Leibniz does not ground the PSR in any of these ways. Instead, he is committed to a value-based grounds of the PSR: God creates the best possible world, and the fact that the PSR obtains in this world contributes to it being the best. I conclude by considering some objections to this way of grounding the PSR.

Christian Wolff über motivierende Gründe und handlungsrelevante Irrtümer

In this paper, I discuss Christian Wolff’s conception of motivating and normative reasons. My aim is to show that in the discussion of error cases, Wolff pursues a strategy that is strikingly similar to the strategy of contemporary defenders of nicht-psychologist accounts of motivating reasons. According to many nicht-psychologist views, motivating reasons are facts. My aim is to show that Wolff’s motivation in pursuing this strategy is very different. The point is that due to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Wolff has to show that error cases are compatible with the PSR. The issue is worth discussing because it is not yet sufficiently explored what motivating reasons are, according to Wolff, and how they relate, in substance, to normative reasons. Methodologically, my approach can be characterized as one of “mutual illumination”: I think it is possible to highlight some crucial ambiguities of Wolff’s conception against the backdrop of the contemporary conception of motivating reasons, but also to question the importance and role of the ontological question of what motivating reasons are in contemporary discussions against the backdrop of Wolff’s position.