Associated work in a cooperative is neither dependent work nor selfemployed work

The celebration of the 100th anniversary of the ILO’s Cooperatives Unit sparked interest in reviewing the progress made by this institution in relation to the recognition and promotion of worker cooperatives. To this end, the Promotion of Cooperatives Recommendation (2002) and the Guidelines concerning statistics of Cooperatives (2018) were taken as the focus of study. From the analysis of both documents, the conclusion was drawn that although the former calls for the recognition of cooperatives in the terms established by the ICA, and for their promotion by States, establishing a legal framework favourable to them and compatible with their nature as self-managed enterprises, the fact is that associated work is still not recognised as a mode of work distinct from dependent work (wage-based) and self-employed(individual) work. This lack of recognition does not correspond to the recommendations of the ICA (2005) claiming that “the relationship of the worker-member with their cooperative should be considered as distinct from that of conventional wage-based dependent work and self-employed work”. The lack of recognition is often attributed to the modest size of these cooperatives and their possible use to circumvent the application of labour law. However, as we have shown, the former cannot be proven, and the latter is not sufficient reason to ignore or prohibit them, since there are other means to combat fake cooperatives. The lack of a contractual relationship between the worker-member and the cooperative is not a weakness but a strength and is the result of having a specific legal type for the cooperative, as opposed to other countries such as France or Italy which, because they lack such a type, are incorporated as Public Limited Companies or Limited Liability Companies, and subsequently hire their members so that they can work in their company.

Why and when beliefs change: A multi-attribute value-based decision problem

Why people do or do not change their beliefs has been a long-standing puzzle. Sometimes people hold onto false beliefs despite ample contradictory evidence; sometimes they change their beliefs without sufficient reason. Here, we propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes of holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. Belief change can then be understood as an economic transaction, in which the multidimensional utility of the old belief is compared against that of the new belief. Change will occur when potential outcomes alter across attributes, for example due to changing environments, or when certain outcomes are made more or less salient.

Why God Thinks what He is Thinking? An Argument against Samuel Newlands’ Brute–Fact–Theory of Divine Ideas in Leibniz’s Metaphysics

According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz’s metaphysics. In this paper, I argue against brute-fact-theories of divine ideas, especially represented by Samuel Newlands in Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility, and elaborate an alternative Leibnizian theory of divine ideas.

Brute Fact

Concerns about contingency are explored further by way of a consideration of brute facts. Facts (ways the universe is) that are explanatorily brute are distinguished from those that are ontologically brute. Explanation, being a product of finite minds, must end somewhere, it would seem, but this leaves open the question whether the universe, or its nature, is in any respect ontologically brute. The difficulty of answering this question is registered and the suggestion advanced that reality, being itself, determines what could or must be the case. This leads to an ontological argument of the form, if there is something, if there is anything at all, there could not have been nothing: nothing comes from nothing. The upshot is something like a metaphysical counterpart to the principle of sufficient reason.

Scientific Error and Error Handling

Error is a common part of scientific practice, which must be accounted for by scientonomy. A scientific error occurs when an agent accepts a theory that should not have been accepted given that agent’s employed method. One might suspect that the handling of scientific error seems to violate the theory rejection theorem according to which a theory becomes rejected only when other theories that are incompatible with the theory become accepted, because it appears as though a theory isn’t replaced by anything. Here, we analyze several instances of scientific error and show that error handling, when properly analyzed, is fully consistent with the theory rejection theorem. We show that instances of scientific error typically involve the rejection of an erroneous conclusion as well as one or more of the premises of the argument that leads to that erroneous conclusion. In most cases, first-order propositions of the original erroneously accepted theory are replaced by other first-order propositions incompatible with them. In some cases, however, first-order propositions are replaced by second-order propositions asserting the lack of sufficient reason for accepting these first-order propositions. In both cases, such a replacement is fully consistent with the theory rejection theorem.

Books and Their Method

This chapter deals with the method of philosophical books during the sixth/twelfth century. It begins with an analysis of Abu l-Barakat al-Baghdadi’s method of i’tibar (careful consideration) and highlights its departure from al-Farabi’s and Avicenna’s (Ibn Sina’s) demonstrative method as the ideal of philosophical inquiry. The chapter looks at how Fakhr al-Din al-Razi describes his own method in his philosophical books and it analyzes the method of “probing and dividing” (sabr wa-taqsim) used therein. Finally, the chapter zooms in on the methodical differences between Fakhr al-Din’s philosophical books and his books of kalam and focuses on the principle of sufficient reason. This philosophical principle requires that every event must have a rational explanation of its cause(s). The principle is universally valid in al-Razi’s philosophical books, yet in his books on kalam only insofar as God’s will is excluded from this requirement. This difference has far-reaching effects on the teachings put forward in these two genres of books.

Does Convergence Liberalism Risk Anarchy?

Public reason liberals argue that coercive social arrangements must be publicly justified in order to be legitimate. According to one model of public reason liberalism, known as convergence liberalism, this means that every moderately idealized member of the public must have sufficient reason, of her own, to accept the arrangement. A corollary of this Principle of Public Justification is that a coercive social arrangement fails to be legitimate so long as even one member of the public fails to have sufficient reason to endorse the arrangement. This high bar for justification has led many critics, most notably David Enoch, to argue that convergence models are incapable of vindicating liberalism. They argue that in a sufficiently diverse society, there will always be someone for whom an arrangement is not justified, and therefore convergence liberalism leads to anarchy – the view that no law or coercive social arrangement is legitimate. Other critics accept that convergence liberalism could vindicate core liberal institutions but nothing more, and thus argue that the view makes libertarians effective “dictators”. In either case, critics hold that this objection is sufficient to reject convergence liberalism, either in favor of alternative public reason views or as a means of rejecting all public reason views. In this paper I argue that convergence liberalism can overcome this anarchy objection. I show that the objection largely rests on misinterpretations of convergence liberalism, and thus clarify aspects of the theory. However, I also show that internal debate over the scope of public justification – what stands in need of justification – must be resolved in favor of a wide scope, encompassing both State-based and non-State-based coercion, in order to overcome the anarchy objection. Therefore, my response to the anarchy objection has implications for how convergence liberalism should be developed going forward.