The evil-god challenge: extended and defended

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN M. COLLINS
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism ◽  
Better Than

AbstractStephen Law developed a challenge to theism, known as the evil-god challenge (Law (2010) ). The evil-god challenge to theism is to explain why the theist's responses to the problem of evil are any better than the diabolist's – who believes in a supremely evil god – rejoinders to the problem of good, when all the theist's ploys (theodicy, sceptical theism, etc.) can be parodied by the diabolist.In the first part of this article, I extend the evil-god challenge by showing that additional theist replies to the problem of evil (more theodicies, the privation view of evil, and others) also may be appropriated, with just as much plausibility, in support of the diabolist position. In the second part of the article, I defend the evil-god challenge against several objections.

scholarly journals Molinist Gunslingers Redux: A Friendly Response to Greg Welty

Perichoresis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Kenneth D. Keathley
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Middle Knowledge ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Libertarian Freedom ◽  
Better Than

Abstract Philosopher Greg Welty contributed a chapter entitled ‘Molinist Gunslingers: God and the Authorship of Sin’, to a book devoted to answering the charge that Calvinism makes God the author of sin (Calvinism and the Problem of Evil). Welty argues that Molinism has the same problems as Calvinism concerning God’s relationship to sin, regardless of what view of human freedom Molinism may affirm. The Molinist believes that God generally uses his knowledge of the possible choices of libertarianly free creatures in order to accomplish his will. (This knowledge is typically categorized as residing within God’s middle knowledge.) But affirming libertarian freedom for humans, he argues, does not help in dealing with the question of God’s relationship to evil. Therefore, Molinism is no better than Calvinism, at least concerning this issue. In response to Welty, (1) I agree with him that Molinism does not have a moral advantage over what he calls ‘mysterian, apophatic’ Calvinism, but Molinists don’t claim that it does, and (2) I argue that, contra Welty, Molinism indeed does have a moral advantage over the Calvinist versions that do employ causal determinism. Welty does not take ‘intentions’ into consideration in his argument, and this is a serious flaw. In the libertarian model of Molinism, intent originates in the doer of evil. However, in the compatibilist model of causal determinism, ultimately God implants intent. Thus, adherents of causal determinism have difficulty not laying responsibility at the feet of God.

Egoism or the problem of evil: a dilemma for sceptical theism

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-325
Author(s):  
BENJAMIN T. RANCOURT
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractSceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable that it would be misguided to use them in our decision-making. The first horn undermines theism, while the second undermines our moral decision-making. Thus, sceptical theism is problematic.

Descartes's sceptical theism

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-527
Author(s):  
THADDEUS S. ROBINSON
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractIn the first part of the article I show how Descartes employs the sceptical theist strategy as part of his response to the problem of evil in Meditation Four. However, Descartes's use of this strategy seems to raise a serious challenge to his whole project: if Descartes is ignorant of God's purposes, then how can he be sure that God doesn't have some morally sufficient reason for creating him with unreliable clear and distinct perceptions? Drawing on related objections from Mersenne and Hobbes, I show in the second half of the article how Descartes can sidestep this objection.

The Problem of Evil & Sceptical Theism

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 45-54
Author(s):  
Justin McBrayer
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Real Problem ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractThe problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of a perfect God with the existence of horrible things in the world. Many take this problem as a convincing reason to be an atheist. But others think that the problem can be solved. One prominent solution is called ‘sceptical theism’. A sceptical theist is someone who believes in God but thinks that the problem of evil is not a real problem since humans are unable to see whether the horrible things in our world are truly pointless or else serve some greater purpose.

Sceptical theism and the evil-god challenge

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 549-561 ◽  
Author(s):  
PERRY HENDRICKS
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sceptical Theism

AbstractThis article is a response to Stephen Law's article ‘The evil-god challenge’. In his article, Law argues that if belief in evil-god is unreasonable, then belief in good-god is unreasonable; that the antecedent is true; and hence so is the consequent. In this article, I show that Law's affirmation of the antecedent is predicated on the problem of good (i.e. the problem of whether an all-evil, all-powerful, and all-knowing God would allow there to be as much good in the world as there is), and argue that the problem of good fails. Thus, the antecedent is unmotivated, which renders the consequent unmotivated. Law's challenge for good-god theists is to show that good-god theism is not rendered unreasonable by the problem of evil in the same way that evil-god theism is rendered unreasonable by the problem of good. Insofar as the problem of good does not render belief in evil-god unreasonable, Law's challenge has been answered: since it is not unreasonable to believe in evil-god (at least for the reasons that Law gives) it is not unreasonable to believe in good-god. Finally, I show that – my criticism aside – the evil-god challenge turns out to be more complicated and controversial than it initially appears, for it relies on the (previously unacknowledged) contentious assumption that sceptical theism is false.

The structure of the contemporary debate on the problem of evil

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
IAN WILKS
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Limited Role ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Empirical Argument ◽  
Sceptical Theism ◽  
The Way

This paper concerns the attempt to formulate an empirical version of the problem of evil, and the attempt to counter this version by what is known as ‘sceptical theism’. My concern is to assess what is actually achieved in these attempts. To this end I consider the debate between them against the backdrop of William Rowe's distinction between expanded standard theism and restricted standard theism (which I label E and R respectively). My claim is that the empirical version significantly fails to challenge E in the way that a workable logical version would; and that sceptical theism significantly fails to defend R in the way that a workable theodicy would. My conclusion is that sceptical theism and the empirical argument play a significantly more limited role in the debate over evil than the arguments they are supposed to replace.

Psychology and the problem of evil

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.

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