Molinism’s Value in Easing Mistrust of God Stemming From Suffering and Divine Silence

One issue that sometimes produces mistrust of God in the life of a Christian is God’s perceived silence when He allows a trial to enter the believer’s life—especially when the believer has been faithfully praying that God would not allow it and there is no evident reason why God would not answer this prayer. This paper examines the nature of trust and some key reasons why it is difficult to trust God. It then argues that accepting the truth of human libertarian freedom and divine middle knowledge provides a powerful basis for thinking that God has meticulous providential control over the world without implicating God in evil, and this can help believers to trust God when they face trials and wrestle with His silence and apparent unresponsiveness to prayer.

Middle Knowledge: Human Freedom in Divine Sovereignty

In the last two or three decades, we have witnessed a renewed interest in spirituality in Christian academic circles. More recently, we have also seen a growing number of publi­cations on the mission and missional church—both on popular and academic levels. While one can easily find many quality works on Christian spirituality and some decent books on mission/missional church, one would only find a few works that combine both themes in a single volume. In this work, Charles Fen­sham, professor of theology at Knox College, Toronto, attempts to do just that—as one may discern from the book’s subtitle: A Missional Spirituality. As such, this book ad­dress­es those who have interest in spirituality and/or in mission but particularly to those who would like to see how biblical missional impetus shapes a particular understanding of Christian spirituality.

The Catholic Reception of Aquinas in the De auxiliis Controversy

In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Catholic theologians debated how to reconcile God’s predestination and grace with human free choice. The de auxiliis controversy had as its touchstones the works of the Dominican Domingo Báñez and the Jesuit Luis de Molina. Pope Paul V concluded the debates in Rome on these questions, the Congregatio de auxiliis (1597–1607), by prohibiting the accusation of heresy from either side in this quarrel. Dominicans, initially accused of Calvinism, and Jesuits, charged at first with semi-Pelagianism, generally claimed that their conclusions were at least consistent with Thomas Aquinas’ principles. But key notions in this controversy, such as physical predetermination, middle knowledge, and efficacious grace, are not found in Aquinas’ corpus, which encouraged theologians to account for the appearance of novelty. In the aftermath of these debates, Thomism was associated with these soteriological questions, and many Catholic theologians envisioned Thomas Aquinas as Augustine’s faithful disciple.

Seventeenth-Century Lutheran Reception of Aquinas

Academic German Lutherans of the seventeenth century made full use of the theology and philosophy that had been handed down to them, in which Thomas Aquinas was a significant voice among other medieval schoolmen. Lutherans did not view Thomas as an authority, though many of them valued his thought. Normally he was to them an important medieval schoolman among many others. Having a shared theological heritage (Holy Scripture and St Augustine), points of similarity between Thomas and seventeenth-century Lutherans are not difficult to find. On the de auxiliis controversy, Lutherans accepted the new vocabulary of the Molinist side (middle knowledge) and rejected the new vocabulary of the Dominican side (natural predetermination), but did not find either side of the debate to be correct. Broad philosophical similarities between Thomas and seventeenth-century Lutherans could be demonstrated, but sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Aristotelian philosophers were far more influential.

Hurtado de Mendoza on the “Moral” Modality

One of the prominent debates of post-Tridentine scholasticism addressed probability, often expressed by the term “moral” (or adverbially, “morally”), originally motivated by the epistemology of decision-making and the debates on predestination and “middle knowledge”. Puente (or Pedro) Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641), an Iberian Jesuit and the author of one of the earliest Jesuit philosophy courses, entered this debate in the early-seventeenth century. This paper presents his 1610s and 1620s analyses of different forms or degrees of evidence, certainty, and necessity or impossibility, addressing the commonly-used trichotomy of the “metaphysical”, “physical”, and “moral”, in which “moral” is the weakest form of a modality, together with the paradigmatic examples and interesting applications of the framework.

Evolution, Middle Knowledge, and Theodicy

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between a nonlapsarian, evolutionary account of the origin of sin and the potential ramifications this might have for theodicy. I begin by reviving an early twentieth century evolutionary model of the origin of sin before discussing the most prominent objection which it elicits, namely, that if sin is merely the misuse of natural animal passions and habits, then God is ultimately answerable for the existence of sin in the human sphere (the “Responsibility Argument”). Though I suggest that this argument likely misfires, my main concern lies elsewhere. For the proponent of the Responsibi- lity Argument will customarily reject an evolutionary account of sin’s origin and instead endorse something like the traditional Fall account—the doctrine of Origi- nal Sin. I argue, however, that the Fall theory is also clearly subject to a parallel Responsibility Argument, so long as we take God to possess (minimally) Molina’s scientia media. While I will not pretend to have solved every issue in my discus- sion of Molinism, still the desired conclusion should emerge unscathed: if the Responsibility Argument is a problem for an evolutionary account of the origin of sin, then it is a problem for the Fall doctrine, too.

The Problem of Bad Popes: The Argument from Conspicuous Corruption

The fact that a number of popes have been bad in the sense that they did not even meet minimal standards of moral integrity and sincere piety poses a serious problem for Roman Catholicism. After surveying a gallery of these infamous popes, I hone in more exactly on just what the problem is. I then argue that the problem remains on both a weak providence view and a strong providence view. According to the former, there is no guarantee that the man chosen pope is God’s will. According to the latter, deploying the resources of middle knowledge, God can make sure that popes infallibly avoid error and teach only truth by making sure the right man is chosen pope. Neither view satisfactorily explains how the papacy can be as important as Rome says it is while so many popes have been such unworthy holders of the office.

The Harmony and Consent of Divine and Human Willing

Perkins argues for the harmony of a human willing that is genuinely contingent and characterized by capacity for opposite or contrary choices with the overarching providence of God. To accomplish this, he adopts a version of the theory of a divine “premotion.” This premotion is necessary to the eventuation of any and all events, whether necessary, contingent, or free. This resolution has affinities with the argument posed by Dominican or Thomist writers in Perkins’ time against the Molinist notion of middle knowledge. Conjoined with Perkins’ voluntarist reading of freed choice, it serves to explain how divine and human will only as taken together are sufficient to explain free acts of human beings.

How God Knows Counterfactuals of Freedom

One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of divine knowledge.