China: The Next Economic Superpower. By William H. Overholt. [London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993. 293 pp. £18.95. ISBN 0–297–82165–2.] - China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy. By Gerald Segal. [London: Brasseys for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 287. 72 pp. £10.50, $17.00. ISSN 05567–932X. ISSN 1–85753–1.] - China in Transition: Changing Conditions and Implications for U.S. Interests. By Robert G. Sutter, Shirley Kan and Kerry Dumbaugh. [Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 93–1061 S, 121993. 23 pp.] - China as a Security Concern in Asia: Perceptions, Assessment, and U.S. Options. By Robert G. Sutter and Shirley Kan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94–32 S, 011994. 27 pp.] - China's Growing Military Power and Implications for East Asia. By Lloyd R. Vasey. [Honolulu: Pacific Forum/CSIS Policy Report Series, 081993. 21 pp.]

1994 ◽  
Vol 138 ◽  
pp. 517-520
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh
2018 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 1197-1205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcin Kaczmarski

A decade ago, Beijing's relations with Moscow were of marginal interest to China scholars. Topics such as growing Sino-American interdependence-cum-rivalry, engagement with East Asia or relations with the developing world overshadowed China's relationship with its northern neighbour. Scholars preoccupied with Russia's foreign policy did not pay much attention either, regarding the Kremlin's policy towards China as part and parcel of Russia's grand strategy directed towards the West. The main dividing line among those few who took a closer look ran between sceptics and alarmists. The former interpreted the post-Cold War rapprochement as superficial and envisioned an imminent clash of interests between the two states. The latter, a minority, saw the prospect of an anti-Western alliance.


Author(s):  
A. A. Kireeva

The article deals with the transformation of Japan’s strategy vis-a-vis China. China and Japan are the most powerful states in East Asia in economic, political and military dimensions. They constitute two poles which shape the regional subsystem of international relations. China’s rise presents a considerable challenge for Japan’s foreign policy alongside with immense opportunity for the state’s development, with Japan’s and China’s positions, as well stability in East Asia resting upon Japan’s strategy towards China. Japan’s China strategy in the aftermath of World War II prior to 2010-2011 can be characterized as engagement with elements of containment. Japan has to a significant degree accommodated China’s rise by facilitating the successful implementation of its grand strategy, seen as the restoration of a great power status that China lost in the 19th century opium wars. The beginning of the 21st century saw a reassessment of Japan’s foreign policy and adopting a proactive stance. There is a divergence of opinion as to Japan’s strategy towards China in 2000s: while a number of scholars believe that there was a shift to balancing, others conclude that no such trend existed and “hedging” would be a more accurate definition, as it enables a state to protect from risks with regional coalitions. The early 2010s have seen Japan’s China strategy increasingly transforming into balancing and containment influenced by Japan’s growing perception of China’s maritime activities in the East China Sea as a threat to its security. However, there is growing possibility of adopting a “dual hedging” strategy, as China is first of all regarded as the key economic partner for Japan’s successful development.


1971 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lois G. Schwoerer

The struggle between King and Parliament in 1641-42 for command of the militia was to King Charles I “the Fittest Subject for a King's Quarrel.” As the King himself and a group of pamphleteers, preachers and members of Parliament realized, the controversy was not just a contest for control of military power. The fundamental issue was a change in England's government, a shift in sovereignty from King or King-in-Parliament to Parliament alone. As Charles explained, “Kingly Power is but a shadow” without command of the militia. His contemporaries, representing various political allegiances, also testified to the significance of the contest over the militia. They described it as the “avowed foundation” of the Civil War, “the greatest concernment” ever faced by the House of Commons, and the “great quarrel” between the King and his critics. To some men it was this dispute over military authority and the implications for government which were inherent in it, rather than disagreements about religion, taxes or foreign policy, that made civil war unavoidable.Concern about military authority first erupted in the fall of 1641 in response to a series of events – rumors of plots involving the King, the presence in London of disbanded soldiers who had returned from the war with Scotland, the “Incident” in Scotland, and above all the rebellion in Ireland which required the levying of an army to subdue those rebels.


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