Rules and the Rule-Following Argument

1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Schauer
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Crispin Wright

Sparked by books by Saul Kripke and Crispin Wright, the last several years have seen a renewal of interest in Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules. A large part of the contemporary discussion centers on what it is to follow a rule, how it is that human beings come to follow them, and what facts, mental or otherwise, determine or explain why some but not other logically equivalent extensions of a rule are deemed to constitute a following of the rule.

scholarly journals Realist and antirealist interpretations of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-50
Author(s):  
Andrej Jandric
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Semantic Realism ◽  
Conceptual Distinction ◽  
Sceptical Paradox

The sceptical paradox which Kripke found in Wittgenstein?s rule-following considerations threatens the very notion of meaning. However, Kripke also offered a sceptical solution to it, according to which semantic sentences have no truth conditions, but their meaning is determined by assertability conditions instead. He presented Wittgenstein?s development as the abandoning of semantic realism of the Tractatus in favour of semantic antirealism, characteristic of Philosophical Investigations. Crispin Wright, although at points critical of Kripke?s interpretation, also understood the rule-following considerations as containing a crucial argument for antirealism. Contrary to Wright, John McDowell maintained that they offer a transcendental argument for realism. In this paper, I will argue that neither the realist nor the antirealist reading is faithfull to Wittgenstein, as his important conceptual distinction between criteria and symptoms is not adequately recoverable in any of them. Hence the upshot of rulefollowing considerations is that the distinction between realism and antirealism should not be articulated in terms of truth/assertability conditions.

Wittgenstein and the Transmission of Traditions

1990 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Anthony O'Hear
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Considerable Discussion

In this country, we tend to look at Wittgenstein in a rather ahistorical way. We see his concerns as fundamentally logico-linguistic, following on first from the work of Frege and Russell, and then referring back indirectly to the concerns of the British empiricists, to those of Locke and Hume, say, on such matters as the reference of our talk about sensations and scepticism about the external world. Recently there has been considerable discussion of the extent to which Wittgenstein's own analysis of the private language and of rule-following might not itself be a new version of a fundamentally Humean scepticism: according to Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein's arguments amount to a demonstration that there is no more reason for speakers of a language to follow the rules governing the concepts of that language in the same way than on the Humean account there is any reason for an effect to follow its causes (Kripke, 1981).

Solitary Rule-Following

Philosophy ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 67 (261) ◽  
pp. 285-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. S. Champlin
Keyword(s):  
Current Debate ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Rule Following

Can a rule be followed by one person who has lived all his life in as complete isolation from other human beings as is consistent with his mere physical survival?This question divides philosophers as sharply today as it did over thirty years ago when, prompted by their reading of Wittgenstein, they first asked it. My aim here is to suggest a way of reconciling the two opposing sides in the current debate. I also hope to explain why it was that Wittgenstein did not concern himself with the complexities I am about to discuss, which none the less are, I believe, at the root of the difficulties we experience when we try to understand what Wittgenstein said about following a rule and to think clearly about this question.

scholarly journals What does the „bedrock“ of rules consist of? Mcdowell on Kripke’s and Wright’s interpretation of Wittgenstein

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Michal Sládecek
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Linguistic Rules ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
Language Norms ◽  
Forms Of Life

This text discusses McDowell?s position with regard to particular problems of Wittgenstein?s philosophy, primarily through his criticism of Saul Kripke?s and Crispin Wright?s interpretation of Wittgenstein?s understanding of rules. What these interpretations have in common are certain perspectives of the possibility of grasping rules, when the solution differs both from the explanation through interpretation and from the platonism of rules. According to McDowell, Kripke?s and Wright?s interpretation state that congruence of individuals and their behavior, that is, their use of language, comes before language norms and meanings. Normativity of linguistic rules is eliminated in this way, that is, it is compensated with description of current public use of language which basically does not follow Wittgenstein?s initial intention. Contrary to this, McDowell speaks about Wittgenstein?s emphasis placed on the autonomy of rules, as well as on the implicit normative basis of forms of life. The last part of the text considers justifiability of McDowell?s criticism of these two interpretations. It is also emphasized that beside the fact that particular objections referring to the importance of practice and interpretation are not sufficiently founded in writings of Kripke and Wright, there still is a significant criticism, which has substantially contributed to understanding Wittgenstein?s positions regarding rules and their practical basis.

Saul Kripke

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. W. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke

Rate of Absorption of Water from Stomach and Small Bowel of Human Beings

1954 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 565-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Scholer ◽  
Charles F. Code
Keyword(s):  
Small Bowel ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Rate Of Absorption

A Study of the Action of Prostigmine on the Bowel of Human Beings

1949 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 970-977 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. McMahon ◽  
Charles F. Code ◽  
Willtam G. Saver ◽  
J. Arnold Bargen
Keyword(s):  
Human Beings

Constructing and Deconstructing Concepts

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 249-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles A. Doan ◽  
Ronaldo Vigo
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Model Performance ◽  
Unsupervised Classification ◽  
Family Resemblance ◽  
Category Membership ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Relational Patterns ◽  
Optimal Classification

Abstract. Several empirical investigations have explored whether observers prefer to sort sets of multidimensional stimuli into groups by employing one-dimensional or family-resemblance strategies. Although one-dimensional sorting strategies have been the prevalent finding for these unsupervised classification paradigms, several researchers have provided evidence that the choice of strategy may depend on the particular demands of the task. To account for this disparity, we propose that observers extract relational patterns from stimulus sets that facilitate the development of optimal classification strategies for relegating category membership. We conducted a novel constrained categorization experiment to empirically test this hypothesis by instructing participants to either add or remove objects from presented categorical stimuli. We employed generalized representational information theory (GRIT; Vigo, 2011b , 2013a , 2014 ) and its associated formal models to predict and explain how human beings chose to modify these categorical stimuli. Additionally, we compared model performance to predictions made by a leading prototypicality measure in the literature.

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