Saul Kripke

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. W. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke

David Lewis’s Place in Analytic Philosophy

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Soames
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
A Priority

This chapter is devoted to one of the most fascinating figures of the twentieth century, David Lewis. The key to understanding this author of so many works in so many areas of philosophy is to see how his views are related to those of his colleague Saul Kripke as well as to those of his teacher W. V. O. Quine. Like Kripke, Lewis embraced the modalities (necessity and a priority) that Quine rejected. Also like Kripke, Lewis had no sympathy for Quine’s early verificationism or his flights from intension and intention, and he was straightforwardly a realist about science in general. However, despite these similarities with Kripke, Lewis’s analysis of necessity could not be more different from Kripke’s. Quine taught that vindicating naturalism and extensionalism required eliminating intensional facts and rejecting intensional constructions, his student Lewis, however, tried to show that intensional facts are just a species of extensional facts, and that intensional constructions in language are no threat to the integrity of an austere, naturalistic vision of reality.

Answering the Problem of Secondary Qualities

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Secondary Qualities

Reid's account of secondary qualities offers an alternative to the Non-Physicality Thesis from Chapter 2. It explains how secondary qualities can be objective without featuring obviously in scientific discussions. Perception alone reveals the existence of secondary qualities but leaves science to discern their natures This chapter answers Frank Jackson's case against counting secondary qualities as objective and relates Reid's secondary qualities to Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam's work on empirically discovered identities.

The Predicate of Existence

2019 ◽  
pp. 14-37
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau
Keyword(s):  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Order Property ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Existential Quantifier ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
David Kaplan ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions ◽  
Nathan Salmon

Kant famously declared that existence is not a (real) predicate. This famous dictum has been seen as echoed in the doctrine of the founders of modern logic, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, that existence isn’t a first-order property possessed by individuals, but rather a second-order property expressed by the existential quantifier. Russell in 1905 combined this doctrine with his new theory of descriptions and declared the paradox of nonexistence to be resolved without resorting to his earlier distinction between existence and being. In recent years, however, logicians and philosophers like Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, and Nathan Salmon have argued that there is no defensible reason to deny that existence is a property of individuals. Kant’s dictum has also been re-evaluated, the result being that the paradox of nonexistence has not, after all, disappeared. Yet it’s not clear how exactly Kripke et al. propose to resolve the paradox.

Kripke, Cartesian Intuitions, and Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-238
Author(s):  
George Sher
Keyword(s):  
Identity Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Initial Section ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestion against some of the possible objections to it.Recent materialists have not been overly impressed by the Cartesian claim that minds and bodies (mental states and physical states, etc.) can be imagined or conceived separately from each other. Their usual reply is that this is only to be expected, given the contingent nature of the identify involved. Kripke, however, has argued persuasively that such a reply is unacceptable because it overlooks a crucial fact about the terms in which the identity theory is couched.

The complexity of decision procedures in relevance logic II

1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 1774-1802 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alasdair Urquhart
Keyword(s):  
Lower Bound ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Linear Logic ◽  
Decision Procedures ◽  
Search Tree ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Decision Method ◽  
Relevant Logics ◽  
Primitive Recursive

In this paper, we show that there is no primitive recursive decision procedure for the implication-conjunction fragments of the relevant logics R, E and T, as well as for a family of related logics. The lower bound on the complexity is proved by combining the techniques of an earlier paper on the same subject [20] with a method used by Lincoln, Mitchell, Scedrov and Shankar in proving that propositional linear logic is undecidable.The decision problem for the pure implicational fragments of E and R were solved by Saul Kripke in a tour de force of combinatorial reasoning, published only as an abstract [9]. Belnap and Wallace extended Kripke's decision procedure to the implication-negation fragment of E in [3]; an account of their decision method is to be found in [1, pp. 124–139]. The decision method extends immediately to the implication/negation fragment of R. In fact, in the case of R we can go farther: Meyer in his thesis [13] showed how to translate the logic LR, which results from R by omitting the distribution axiom, into R→⋀, so that the decision procedure can be extended to all of LR. This decision procedure has been implemented as a program Kripke by Thistlewaite, McRobbie and Meyer [17]. The program is not simply a straightforward implementation of the decision procedure; finite matrices are used extensively to prune invalid nodes from the search tree.

Philosophical Troubles, by Saul Kripke.

Mind ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 124 (495) ◽  
pp. 927-933
Author(s):  
Graeme Forbes
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke

Ostension, Names and Natural Kind Terms

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohan Matthen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Recent Issue ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions

It seems to be a part of the oral and written tradition of contemporary philosophy that Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have resurrected a kind of Aristotelianism about natural kinds by reference to purely semantic ideas. Thus in a recent issue of the Journal of Philosophy, M. R. Ayers writes that according to Kripke and Putnam: “The names ‘gold’, ‘tiger’ etc. have their meaning … by being the name of, or, more technically, by ‘rigidly designating’, a natural kind.” And in the immediately following pages he suggests that the view Kripke and Putnam arrive at is “not at all unlike Aristotelian doctrine”, but arrived at from “the rather special point of view of a concern with modal logic, and against the background of Russell's theory of descriptions, the modern obsession with proper names, and so forth”. Presumably what Ayers is alleging here is that something like the Aristotelian position on substance, species, essential properties and so forth is or is intended to be the outcome of the Kripke-Putnam investigations.

Rules and the Rule-Following Argument

1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Schauer
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Crispin Wright

Sparked by books by Saul Kripke and Crispin Wright, the last several years have seen a renewal of interest in Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules. A large part of the contemporary discussion centers on what it is to follow a rule, how it is that human beings come to follow them, and what facts, mental or otherwise, determine or explain why some but not other logically equivalent extensions of a rule are deemed to constitute a following of the rule.

Do Proper Names Always Rigidly Designate?

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Nute
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Referring Expressions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Naming And Necessity

Many philosophers have claimed possible worlds semantics is incoherent because of insoluble problems involved in the notion of identifying a single individual in different worlds. One frequent approach to trans-world identification has been to assume that all the possible worlds, complete with their populations, are described by means of qualities alone prior to our considering the question of identification of the same individual in each world in which it exists. If we interpret possible worlds semantics in this way, trans-world identification could only be accomplished on the basis of some properties the individual has uniquely in every world in which it exists. This becomes problematic since the individual doesn't have the same properties in every world. In ‘Naming and Necessity’ and ‘Identity and Necessity’ Saul Kripke rejects such an account of both possible worlds and trans-world identification, developing an alternative interpretation of the new semantics. His approach involves a distinction between referring expressions which designate different individuals in different worlds according to the distribution of properties within each world and referring expressions which designate the same individual in every world.

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