We investigate why biologists fail to contribute to biological databases although almost all of them use these
databases for research. We find, using evolutionary game theory and computer simulations, that (a) the initial distribution
of contributors who are patient determines whether a culture of contribution will prevail or not (b) institutions (where
institution means “a significant practice, relationship, or organization in a society or culture”) that incentivize patience and
therefore limit free riding make contribution more likely and, (c) a stable institution, whether it incentivizes patience or
not, will increase contribution. As a result we suggest there is a trade-off between the benefits of changing institutions to
incentivize patience and the costs of the change itself. Moreover, even if it is possible to create institutions that incentivize
patience among scientists such institutions may nevertheless fail. We create a computer simulation of a population of
biologists based on our theory. These simulations suggest that institutions should focus more on rewards rather than
penalties to incentivize a culture of contribution. Our approach therefore provides a methodology for developing a
practical blueprint for organizing scientists to encourage cooperation and maximizing scientific output.
Incorporating Community Annotation Interfaces into the CIPRO2.5 Database with Comprehensible Sketches to Support Quick Annotations of Proteome Data.
