evolutionary game theory
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2022 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 114-136
Gang Wang ◽  
Yuechao Chao ◽  
Yong Cao ◽  
Tieliu Jiang ◽  
Wei Han ◽  

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Tsuneya Yoshida ◽  
Tomonari Mizoguchi ◽  
Yasuhiro Hatsugai

AbstractNon-Hermitian topology is a recent hot topic in condensed matters. In this paper, we propose a novel platform drawing interdisciplinary attention: rock–paper–scissors (RPS) cycles described by the evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we demonstrate the emergence of an exceptional point and a skin effect by analyzing topological properties of their payoff matrix. Furthermore, we discover striking dynamical properties in an RPS chain: the directive propagation of the population density in the bulk and the enhancement of the population density only around the right edge. Our results open new avenues of the non-Hermitian topology and the evolutionary game theory.

Drones ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 13
Daniel H. Stolfi ◽  
Matthias R. Brust ◽  
Grégoire Danoy ◽  
Pascal Bouvry

In this article, we propose SuSy-EnGaD, a surveillance system enhanced by games of drones. We propose three different approaches to optimise a swarm of UAVs for improving intruder detection, two of them featuring a multi-objective optimisation approach, while the third approach relates to the evolutionary game theory where three different strategies based on games are proposed. We test our system on four different case studies, analyse the results presented as Pareto fronts in terms of flying time and area coverage, and compare them with the single-objective optimisation results from games. Finally, an analysis of the UAVs trajectories is performed to help understand the results achieved.

Pedro García-Victoria ◽  
Matteo Cavaliere ◽  
Miguel A. Gutiérrez-Naranjo ◽  
Miguel Cárdenas-Montes

2021 ◽  
Jorge Zazueta

We develop a simple model of technology adoption based on evolutionary game theory that corresponds with intuition but also uncovers a non-ideal equilibrium that we call the technology adoption dilemma.

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 20-32
Anastasia Sokolova ◽  
Olga Kalachikova

The aim of this article is to investigate the connection between behavioral economy and migration processes. Behavioral economics is a relatively new phenomenon in science and the fact that some research in this area has earned the Nobel Prize makes its contribution significant in the consideration of economic processes. The analysis of sources shows that in the field of Russian studies there is practically no mention of the fact that migration behavior can be explained by the behavioral economics theses. In this article, we explore several key ideas in this area: nudge theory, prospect theory, evolutionary game theory, cognitive distortion, and hedonistic adaptation. In this article, we put forward a hypothesis that migration processes can not only be explained from the standpoint of behavioral economics but can also be regulated using the tools of this direction. Behavioral economics can be the key for discovering the dynamics and true motives of migration. The analysis of information in this area shows, that a person makes decisions mainly based not on the laws of logic and rationalism. Paradoxes such as cognitive biases, etc. reduce the effectiveness of an individual's actions and provide an incentive for the scientific community to expand the number of empirical studies of migration processes within the framework of behavioral economics theories.

2021 ◽  
Yuxun Zhou ◽  
Rahman Mohammad Mafizur ◽  
Khanam Rasheda ◽  
Brad R. Taylor

Abstract Purpose – Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 2019. The goal of this paper is to understand strategic selections from governments, enterprises, and consumers to maximize their respective utility during Corona Virus Disease 2019, and the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers.Design/Methodology/approach - This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory, involving governments, businesses, and consumers, to firstly analyze the evolutionary stable strategies and to secondly analyze the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on their strategy selection during Corona Virus Disease 2019. Thirdly, this paper uses numerical analysis to simulate the strategy formation process of governments, enterprises, and consumers in Japan and India based on their different penalty and subsidy mechanism.Findings – This paper suggests that there are four evolutionarily stable strategies corresponding to the actual anti-epidemic situations of different countries in reality. We find that different subsidy and penalty mechanisms lead to different evolutionary stable strategies. If governments, enterprises, and consumers fighting the pandemic together, the government need to set a low subsidy mechanism and a high penalty mechanism.Originality/value - There are some limitations in the literature, such as long term strategies, rational hypothesis, and convergence path analysis in higher dimensional evolutionary game theory. This paper fills the gap and extends the theory of COVID-19 management theory. Firstly, this paper has important practical significance. This paper finds out the long-term equilibrium strategies of governments, businesses, and consumers under Corona Virus Disease 2019, which can provide an important theoretical and decision-making basis for pandemic prevention and control. Secondly, our paper extends the analytical paradigm of the tripartite evolutionary game theory. We extend the analysis of the dynamic process from the initial point to the convergence point and make a theoretical contribution to the development of high-dimensional evolutionary game theory.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Yanhua Liu ◽  
Hui Chen ◽  
Hao Zhang ◽  
Ximeng Liu

Evolutionary game theory is widely applied in network attack and defense. The existing network attack and defense analysis methods based on evolutionary games adopt the bounded rationality hypothesis. However, the existing research ignores that both sides of the game get more information about each other with the deepening of the network attack and defense game, which may cause the attacker to crack a certain type of defense strategy, resulting in an invalid defense strategy. The failure of the defense strategy reduces the accuracy and guidance value of existing methods. To solve the above problem, we propose a reward value learning mechanism (RLM). By analyzing previous game information, RLM automatically incentives or punishes the attack and defense reward values for the next stage, which reduces the probability of defense strategy failure. RLM is introduced into the dynamic network attack and defense process under incomplete information, and a multistage evolutionary game model with a learning mechanism is constructed. Based on the above model, we design the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm. Experimental results demonstrate that the evolutionary game model with RLM has better results in the value of reward and defense success rate than the evolutionary game model without RLM.

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Jinxin Zhang ◽  
Meng Wu

In the blockchain network, to get rewards in the blockchain, blockchain participants pay for various forms of competition such as computing power, stakes, and other resources. Because of the need to pay a certain cost, individual participants cooperate to maintain the long-term stability of the blockchain jointly. In the course of such competition, the game between each other has appeared invisibly. To better understand the blockchain design of cooperation mechanisms, in this paper, we constructed a game framework between participants with different willingness, using evolutionary game theory, and complex network games. We analyzed how the behavior of participants potentially develops with cost and payoff. We consider the expected benefits of participants for the normal growth of the blockchain as the major factor. Considering the behavior of malicious betrayers, the blockchain needs to be maintained in the early stage. Numerical simulation supports our analysis.

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