scholarly journals Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Johnson ◽  
Oleg Smirnov
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Temporal Networks ◽  
Structure Transition ◽  
Time Out ◽  
Transition Rules ◽  
Selection For ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

AbstractWe study a spatial, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism’s behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its decision of when to implement that strategy, which we depict as an organism’s choice of one point in time, out of a set of discrete time slots, at which to carry out its PD strategy. Results indicate selection for cooperators across various time slots and parameter settings, including parameter settings in which cooperation would not evolve in an exclusively spatial model—as in work investigating exogenously imposed temporal networks. Moreover, in the presence of time slots, cooperators’ portion of the population grows even under different combinations of spatial structure, transition rules, and update dynamics, though rates of cooperator fixation decline under pairwise comparison and synchronous updating. These findings indicate that, under certain evolutionary processes, merely existing in time and space promotes the evolution of cooperation.

scholarly journals Aspiration-based coevolution of link weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 180199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Shen ◽  
Chen Chu ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Zhen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Link Weight ◽  
Aspiration Levels ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

In this article, we propose an aspiration-based coevolution of link weight, and explore how this set-up affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In particular, an individual will increase the weight of its link to its neighbours only if the payoff received via this interaction exceeds a pre-defined aspiration. Conversely, if the received payoff is below this aspiration, the link weight with the corresponding neighbour will decrease. Our results show that an appropriate aspiration level leads to a high-cooperation plateau, whereas too high or too low aspiration will impede the evolution of cooperation. We explain these findings with a comprehensive analysis of transition points and with a systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. The presented results provide further theoretical insights with regards to the impact of different aspiration levels on cooperation in human societies.

scholarly journals EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2002 ◽  
Vol 05 (02n03) ◽  
pp. 269-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANK SCHWEITZER ◽  
LAXMIDHAR BEHERA ◽  
HEINZ MÜHLENBEIN
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Critical Conditions ◽  
Agent Interaction ◽  
Spatial Domains ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Small Clusters ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally interacts with his neighbors. Based on a detailed analysis of the local payoff structures we derive critical conditions for the invasion or the spatial coexistence of cooperators and defectors. These results are concluded in a phase diagram that allows us to identify five regimes, each characterized by a distinct spatiotemporal dynamics and a corresponding final spatial structure. In addition to the complete invasion of defectors, we find coexistence regimes with either a majority of cooperators in large spatial domains, or a minority of cooperators organized in small non-stationary domains or in small clusters. The analysis further allowed a verification of computer simulation results by Nowak and May (1993). Eventually, we present simulation results of a true 5-person game on a lattice. This modification leads to non-uniform spatial interactions that may even enhance the effect of cooperation.

scholarly journals Cooperation evolves by the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward

2021 ◽  
Vol 94 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetsushi Ohdaira
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract In the previous studies, the author proposes the payoff-difference-based probabilistic peer-punishment that the probability of punishing a defector increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a defector increases and shows that the proposed peer-punishment effectively increases the number of cooperators and the average payoff of all players. On the other hand, reward as well as punishment is considered to be a mechanism promoting cooperation, and many studies have discussed the effect of reward in the public goods game, a multiplayer version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Based on the discussion of those existing studies, this study introduces the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward that the probability of rewarding a cooperator increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a cooperator increases. The author utilizes the framework of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game of the previous study and shows that the reward of this study realizes the evolution of cooperation except some cases. Graphic abstract

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