Chapter 3 examines the international jurisdiction in sovereign debt disputes and particularly the following matters: service of proceedings; the jurisdiction under the Brussels Regulation, the jurisdiction under English national rules; individual standing of beneficial bondholders; class actions. The chapter also examines the issue of pre-emptive strikes in sovereign debt litigation, in other words whether private creditors may initiate legal actions before the conclusion of the sovereign debt restructuring and how courts may constrain such litigation. The chapter argues that the English courts may stay proceedings if they are brought in contravention of the powers of bondholders under majority action clauses. The chapter lastly addresses the issue of whether the majority may modify the bonds after the English court has issued a judgment.
AbstractDebt restructuring is one of the policy tools available for resolving sovereign debt crises and, while unorthodox, it is not uncommon. We propose a scenario analysis for debt sustainability and integrate it with scenario optimization for risk management in restructuring sovereign debt. The scenario dynamics of debt-to-GDP ratio are used to define a tail risk measure, termed
