The road to the 1980s write-downs of sovereign debt

The Latin American debt crisis consumed the 1980s and was not restricted to Latin America. Starting from the August 1982 Mexican weekend, the crisis had three phases: Concerted Lending (1982-5), Baker Plan (1985-9) and Brady Plan (1989 to mid 1990s). This article describes the evolution of the debt strategy and the road to embracing debt write-downs at the end of the decade. In the absence of an external coordinating mechanism, four groups of parties had to reach agreement on any change in the strategy: the borrowing countries, their commercial bank lenders, the home-country authorities of those lenders, and the International Monetary Fund as the principal international institution. Each group could effectively veto any change in the strategy. This need for consensus is lesson number one from the 1980s for today. Lesson number two is that political economy aspects dictated that the strategy be implemented on a case-by-case basis. The article concludes with an application of these lessons to a similar, but even more global, potential debt crisis in the wake of the COVID pandemic.

USE OF QUANTITATIVE RATIOS FROM THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS IN PREDICTING PRICE BUBBLES ON THE HOUSING MARKET

One of the main causes of the economic and sovereign debt crisis in 2010 – 2012 in some European countries like the United Kingdom, Spain and Ireland was the bursting of the residential market price bubble that was formed in the previous period. In this paper, a specific methodology of indicator analysis of the System of National Accounts and other data has been analyzed if it can help identify and prevent forming of some possible future price bubbles at the residential market, and therefore negative macroeconomic consequences of their bursting. Comparative indicator analysis and critical values suggest measurements of excessive construction activity that led to forming of price bubbles on the residential market. Econometric analysis has shown that it is not possible to establish critical values as variable of interest is not statistically significant.

Seeking Incentives for a Successful Second and third Business Opportunity after Bankruptcy in Times of Recession

In the years of the financial and sovereign debt crisis in Greece, many viable businesses that are facing financial difficulties are led to liquidation rather than timely restructuring, with very few entrepreneurs having a second chance. This corporate failure faced by Greek companies in recent years may have been caused by either endogenous or exogenous factors or a combination of these two. In this paper we investigate the factors (economic, social and political) that will help to facilitate entrepreneurs' access to a second and third opportunity, taking also into account socially vulnerable groups such as disabled people and women entrepreneurs. Moreover, we try to find the characteristics that would encourage honest bankrupt entrepreneurs to a second business venture and the sectors where a second chance may have increased chances of sustainability in Greece. The aim of our research is to lead Greece to higher levels of self-employment, reduction in unemployment, and exit from the crisis.

How Singapore’s Sovereign Debt Risk Has Changed from 2016 to 2021

In this paper, I build an economic model and adapt it to fit Singapore’s economic and historical background. My empirical analysis is based on data about external debt to GDP, foreign investment, and net export products and partners. But I also address concerns about risk factors coming from covid and the oil crisis. In my analysis, even in the worst case, Singapore is not going to be worse than the Netherlands in the IIR rating, which corresponds to an IIR rating of 90. In contrast to my baseline, risk assessment for Singapore is a rating of 93.