EMU and the Sovereign Debt Crisis—Legal Aspects of Monetary Policy Responses and the Banking Union

Author(s):  
Christoph Herrmann ◽  
Corinna Dornacher
2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Rodríguez ◽  
Carlos Carrasco

The paper analyses the monetary policy responses of the European Central Bank (ECB) to the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Our goals are on the one hand to explain chronologically the main measures in conventional and unconventional policies adopted by the ECB and on the other hand to analyse their effects on key interest rates, monetary aggregates and the money multiplier. The assessment is that the ECB?s monetary policy responses to the crisis have been ?too little, too late?, constrained by the institutional framework, which prevents the ECB from acting as a true central bank with the role of lender of last resort.


2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip R Lane

The origin and propagation of the European sovereign debt crisis can be attributed to the flawed original design of the euro. In particular, there was an incomplete understanding of the fragility of a monetary union under crisis conditions, especially in the absence of banking union and other European-level buffer mechanisms. Moreover, the inherent messiness involved in proposing and implementing incremental multicountry crisis management responses on the fly has been an important destabilizing factor throughout the crisis. After diagnosing the situation, we consider reforms that might improve the resilience of the euro area to future fiscal shocks.


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