scholarly journals Host market government corruption and the equity-based foreign entry strategies of multinational enterprises

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 346-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A Sartor ◽  
Paul W Beamish
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Entry Strategies ◽  
Government Corruption ◽  
Foreign Entry

It Takes Two to Tango: Signaling Behavioral Intent in Service Multinationals' Foreign Entry Strategies

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles E. Stevens ◽  
Erin E. Makarius ◽  
Debmalya Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Intent ◽  
Entry Strategies ◽  
Foreign Entry

Analysis of factors underlying foreign entry strategies of terminal operators in container ports

2013 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 72-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Parola ◽  
Theo Notteboom ◽  
Giovanni Satta ◽  
Jean-Paul Rodrigue
Keyword(s):  
Entry Strategies ◽  
Foreign Entry ◽  
Container Ports

Determinants of the Foreign Entry Strategies of Turkish MNEs

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (1) ◽  
pp. 11073
Author(s):  
Ekrem Tatoglu ◽  
Mehmet Demirbag ◽  
Keith Glaister ◽  
Tulay Ilhan-Nas ◽  
Tarhan Okan
Keyword(s):  
Entry Strategies ◽  
Foreign Entry

Government Corruption and the Entry Strategies of Multinationals

2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Rodriguez ◽  
Klaus Uhlenbruck ◽  
Lorraine Eden
Keyword(s):  
Entry Strategies ◽  
Government Corruption

The Impact of Corruption and Institutional Restrictiveness on Entry Strategy: Evidence from Telecommunication Projects in Developing Countriese

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Arash Amirkhany ◽  
Pouya Seifzadeh ◽  
Isar Kiani
Keyword(s):  
Host Country ◽  
Interaction Effect ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Triple Interaction ◽  
Entry Strategies ◽  
Developing Markets ◽  
Wholly Owned Subsidiary ◽  
Entry Strategy ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Impact

This research investigates effects of host country corruption and formal and informal institutional restrictiveness on the entry strategies of foreign multinational enterprises. Using data of over 400 telecommunication projects in developing markets between 2005 and 2011, we find that both formal and informal restrictiveness encourage the MNE to enter using an equity-mode with balanced ownership rather than a wholly owned subsidiary or a partnership with large differential in ownership. However, informal restrictiveness is a stronger force than the formal restrictiveness. We theorize and find a triple interaction effect which shows that this effect is stronger at lower levels than higher levels of informal restrictiveness.

scholarly journals Correction to: Bringing corporate governance into internalization theory: State ownership and foreign entry strategies

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (8) ◽  
pp. 1351-1352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Birgitte Grøgaard ◽  
Asmund Rygh ◽  
Gabriel R. G. Benito
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Internalization Theory ◽  
Entry Strategies ◽  
Foreign Entry ◽  
Theory State

The article Bringing corporate governance into internalization theory.

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