How does successive inpatriation contribute to subsidiary capability building and subsidiary evolution? An organizational knowledge creation perspective

Intra-company knowledge transfer is a key source of competitive advantage for multinational companies (MNCs) and this knowledge is usually embedded in individuals. Drawing on organizational knowledge creation theory, we explore how inpatriation contributes to knowledge transfer and, in turn, subsidiary performance. Inpatriation involves the international assignment of employees from an MNC’s foreign subsidiary to its headquarters. Despite increasing attention to the role of inpatriation, we lack a clear understanding of whether and how inpatriates provide value to their subsidiaries after returning from headquarters. Through a qualitative case study of Japanese MNCs, we demonstrate the process through which inpatriates’ knowledge transfer contributes to subsidiary capability building and subsidiary evolution over time, and explain why successive inpatriation is thus critical to enhance subsidiary performance. Our theoretical model highlights the value of inpatriates as knowledge agents, reveals the process through which inpatriates transfer knowledge between HQ and subsidiaries, and provides a more nuanced understanding of the micro-foundations of intra-MNC knowledge transfer processes. Based on these findings, we argue that inpatriation is not merely a staffing method that is complementary to expatriation, but a key practice in its own right to support subsidiaries’ growth and performance.

Uneven regulatory playing field and bank transparency abroad

Motivated by international business research on institutional arbitrage and headquarters–subsidiary relationships, we examine the effect of regulatory distance on multinational banks’ (MNBs) reporting transparency abroad. Using an international sample of foreign subsidiary banks in 46 host countries from 47 home countries, we find that bank transparency declines when the home countries have tighter activity restrictions than the host countries. We bolster the causal inference using difference-in-differences designs that take advantage of banking reforms and cross-border bank acquisitions. We also find that the result is more pronounced when parent banks have lower capital ratios or when host countries have weaker supervisory power, suggesting that parent banks use opaque reporting to conceal risk-taking abroad. Further analysis finds that less transparent subsidiaries are more likely to fail during financial crises. Overall, our findings suggest that regulatory distance creates negative externalities for bank transparency and stability abroad.