scholarly journals Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games

1996 ◽  
Vol 93 (23) ◽  
pp. 13421-13428 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. A. McCabe ◽  
S. J. Rassenti ◽  
V. L. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Experimental Games

Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games

2000 ◽  
pp. 152-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin A. McCabe ◽  
Stephen J. Rassenti ◽  
Vernon L. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Experimental Games

Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction

1984 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
David K. Smith ◽  
A. M. Colman
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Experimental Games

Game theory and experimental games

1984 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-298
Author(s):  
F.W. Roush
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Experimental Games

Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare ◽  
Branislav L. Slantchev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Almost All

Game theory is the science of interactive decision making. It has been used in the field of international relations (IR) for over 50 years. Almost all of the early applications of game theory in international relations drew upon the theory of zero-sum games, but the first generation of applications was also developed during the most intense period of the Cold War. The theoretical foundations for the second wave of the game theory literature in international relations were laid by a mathematician, John Nash, a co-recipient of the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics. His major achievement was to generalize the minimax solution which emerged from the first wave. The result is the now famous Nash equilibrium—the accepted measure of rational behavior in strategic form games. During the third wave, from roughly the early to mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a distinct move away from static strategic form games toward dynamic games depicted in extensive form. The assumption of complete information also fell by the wayside; games of incomplete information became the norm. Technical refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept both encouraged and facilitated these important developments. In the fourth and final wave, which can be dated, roughly, from around the middle of the 1990s, extensive form games of incomplete information appeared regularly in the strategic literature. The fourth wave is a period in which game theory was no longer considered a niche methodology, having finally emerged as a mainstream theoretical tool.

A Primer on Game Theory and Experimental Games

1983 ◽  
Vol 28 (8) ◽  
pp. 619-620
Author(s):  
Jerome M. Chertkoff
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Experimental Games

Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction.

1984 ◽  
Vol 79 (387) ◽  
pp. 741
Author(s):  
Kathryn Blackmond Laskey ◽  
Andrew Colman
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Experimental Games

scholarly journals Introduction to Game-theory Calculations

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Orsini ◽  
Debora Rizzuto ◽  
Nicola Nante
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Game Tree ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Conflict And Cooperation ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Extensive Form Game ◽  
Zero Sum

Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent and rational decision makers (Myerson 1991). Game-theory concepts apply in economy, sociology, biology, and health care, and whenever the actions of several agents (individuals, groups, or any combination of these) are interdependent. We present a new command gamet to represent the extensive form (game tree) and the strategic form (payoff matrix) of a noncooperative game and to identify the solution of a nonzero and zero-sum game through dominant and dominated strategies, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and Nash equilibrium in pure and fully mixed strategies. Further, gamet can identify the solution of a zero-sum game through maximin criterion and the solution of an extensive form game through backward induction.

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