Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches

Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare ◽  
Branislav L. Slantchev

Game theory is the science of interactive decision making. It has been used in the field of international relations (IR) for over 50 years. Almost all of the early applications of game theory in international relations drew upon the theory of zero-sum games, but the first generation of applications was also developed during the most intense period of the Cold War. The theoretical foundations for the second wave of the game theory literature in international relations were laid by a mathematician, John Nash, a co-recipient of the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics. His major achievement was to generalize the minimax solution which emerged from the first wave. The result is the now famous Nash equilibrium—the accepted measure of rational behavior in strategic form games. During the third wave, from roughly the early to mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a distinct move away from static strategic form games toward dynamic games depicted in extensive form. The assumption of complete information also fell by the wayside; games of incomplete information became the norm. Technical refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept both encouraged and facilitated these important developments. In the fourth and final wave, which can be dated, roughly, from around the middle of the 1990s, extensive form games of incomplete information appeared regularly in the strategic literature. The fourth wave is a period in which game theory was no longer considered a niche methodology, having finally emerged as a mainstream theoretical tool.

2007 ◽  
Vol 10-12 ◽  
pp. 6-11
Author(s):  
Y.X. Sheng ◽  
W.G. Yang

This article utilizes the game theory of the complete information condition and incomplete information condition equilibrium as well as the operation research optimization knowledge, carries on the analysis to the technical transaction of optimal contracts design question, under each kind of situation, in view of the different situation, design each kind of different optimal contracts, thus to do business, both sides both can accept them.


2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Kajii ◽  
Stephen Morris

AbstractThis paper presents a simple framework that allows us to survey and relate some different strands of the game theory literature. We describe a “canonical” way of adding incomplete information to a complete information game. This framework allows us to give a simple “complete theory” interpretation (Kreps in Game theory and economic modelling. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the “higher-order beliefs literature” (Rubinstein in Am Econ Rev 79:385–391, 1989; Monderer and Samet in Games Econ Behav 1:170–190, 1989; Morris et al. in Econ J Econ Soc 63:145–157, 1995; Kajii and Morris in Econ J Econ Soc 65:1283–1309, 1997a) and the “payoff uncertainty approach” (Fudenberg et al. in J Econ Theory 44:354–380, 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg in J Econ Theory 52:243–267, 1990).


2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (5) ◽  
pp. 1402-1422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K Goeree ◽  
Charles A Holt

This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others' decisions. (JEL C72, C92)


2011 ◽  
Vol 403-408 ◽  
pp. 1676-1679
Author(s):  
Qi Jie Wang ◽  
Xiao Gang Wu

This paper studied the game theory about that the listed companies used internal control disclosure as signal under the condition of incomplete information, constructed a signal game model to analyze the internal control information disclosure problem under the condition of incomplete information. It also proposed some policy Suggestions to inspire the listed companies to disclose internal control message veritably.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-658

Sanjit Dhami of Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, University of Leicester reviews “Handbook of Experimental Game Theory” edited by C. M. Capra, Rachel T. A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon, and Tanya S. Rosenblat. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Sixteen papers explore the study of game-theoretic propositions from a scientific approach, covering methodological innovations in the measurement of strategic behavior and static and dynamic games of both complete and incomplete information.”


1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Gibbons

This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.


Author(s):  
Cristina Bicchieri ◽  
Giacomo Sillari

Game theory aims to understand situations in which decision-makers interact strategically. Chess is an example, as are firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, animals fighting over prey, bidders competing in auctions, threats and punishments in long-term relationships, and so on. In such situations, the outcome depends on what the parties do jointly. Decision-makers may be people, organizations, animals, or even genes. In this chapter, the authors review fundamental notions of game theory and their application to philosophy of science. In particular, Section 1 looks at games of complete information through normal and extensive form representations, introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. Section 2 touches on epistemic foundations and correlated equilibrium, and Section 3 examines repeated games and their importance for the analysis of altruism and cooperation. Section 4 deals with evolutionary game theory.


1985 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Snidal

Game theory is elaborated as a theoretical approach to international politics by contrasting it with metaphorical and analogical uses of games. Because it embraces a diversity of models, game theory is especially useful for capturing the most important contextual features of the international system that affect prospects for international cooperation. Through a discussion of the relation among and extension of different game models, the versatility and scope of game-theoretic approaches to international relations are demonstrated. Special attention is paid to the empirical issues of international politics which are raised by game theory and are analyzed in other articles in this symposium.


Author(s):  
D. Degterev ◽  
A. Degterev

The author proposes a historiographical study of the game theory application to the analysis of international negotiations, conditions for modification of multilateral regimes, mechanisms of decision-making in the international organizations. Game theory is a mathematical theory for analysis of strategic behavior (interaction) and it is widely used in the social sciences. It explains the logic of rational behavior of individuals in situations of conflict of interest. Game theory is used by foreign researchers as a method of analysis of international relations. The domestic researchers, however, do not often resorts to it. The “golden age” of game theory was the era of global confrontation between the USSR and the United States.


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