Do supermajority rules really deter extremism? the role of electoral competition

This study investigates how supermajority rules in a legislature affect electoral competition. We construct an extensive-form game wherein parties choose policy platforms in an election. Post election, the policy is determined based on a legislative voting rule. At symmetric equilibrium, supermajority rules induce divergence of policy platforms if and only if the parties are sufficiently attached to their preferred platform. Thus, supermajority rules may not always lead to moderate policies once electoral competition is considered.

Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium

It is well known that Nash equilibria may not be Pareto-optimal; worse, a unique Nash equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated, as in Prisoners’ Dilemma. By contrast, we prove a previously conjectured result: every finite normal-form game of complete information and common knowledge has at least one Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium (NME) in pure strategies, which we define and illustrate. The outcome it gives, which depends on where play starts, may or may not coincide with that given by a Nash equilibrium. We use some simple examples to illustrate properties of NMEs—for instance, that NME outcomes are usually, though not always, maximin—and seem likely to foster cooperation in many games. Other approaches for analyzing farsighted strategic behavior in games are compared with the NME analysis.

Dialogic Reading to Empower Executive Functions in Preschoolers

Among the interventions recently developed to enhance Executive Functions (EFs) in preschoolers, Quincey Quokka’s Quest (QQQ) is an illustrated book proposing EF activities embedded within a shared reading framework (Howard et al., 2017). In the present study, the Italian version of QQQ (QQQIT) was tested in 20 typical developing 4–5 year old children. Standardized tests were used to assess EFs pre- and post- intervention. QQQIT was conducted once a week for 8 weeks in small groups. A positive trend was registered in QQQIT performances from the first to the last sessions and a significant improvement, in comparison to the control condition, was obtained in the Color and Form Game test. These results, supporting the feasibility of the QQQIT intervention and its efficacy in increasing shifting abilities, confirm the usefulness of ecological interventions to empower specific EF components in preschool contexts.

Monty Hall three door ’anomaly’ revisited: a note on deferment in an extensive form game

The Monty Hall game is one of the most discussed decision problems, but where a convincing behavioral explanation of the systematic deviations from probability theory is still lacking. Most people not changing their initial choice, when this is beneficial under information updating, demands further explanation. Not only trust and the incentive of interestingly prolonging the game for the audience can explain this kind of behavior, but the strategic setting can be modeled more sophisticatedly. When aiming to increase the odds of winning, while Monty’s incentives are unknown, then not to switch doors can be considered as the most secure strategy and avoids a sure loss when Monty’s guiding aim is not to give away the prize. Understanding and modeling the Monty Hall game can be regarded as an ideal teaching example for fundamental statistic understandings.

Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach

In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We assume that a firm obtains a certain cost advantage that allows it to produce goods at a lower unit cost. We show that if the level of the cost advantage is “moderate”, then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a partition function form game. We also show that if the technology for the low-cost production can be copied, then the cost advantage may prevent a cartel from splitting.

The Mysterious Talent

The article studies giftedness and talent representation in contemporary British literature by means of analysing three novels: “When We Were Orphans” by Kazuo Ishiguro, “The Thirteenth Tale” by Diane Setterfield and “Milton in America” by Peter Ackroyd. The topic of giftedness appears in these works as part of the genre and form game, which is an important immanent property of postmodern literature. The plots and themes are reconsidered and played with like a set of toy building blocks used to construct a new building that makes sense only in the context of the already existing constructions. The paper shows that the concept of giftedness appears in contemporary British novels mainly as part of a game of parody, which reflects the idea of the world as imagery and confusion.

Modeling competitive situations

This chapter studies how competitive situations are conventionally modeled in noncooperative game theory. It uses two sorts or forms of models: the so-called extensive form game and the normal or strategic form game. An extensive form representation of a noncooperative game is composed of the following list of items: a list of players; a game tree; an assignment of decision nodes to players or to nature; lists of actions available at each decision node and a correspondence between immediate successors of each decision node and available actions; information sets; an assignment of payoffs for each player to terminal nodes; and probability assessments over the initial nodes and over the actions at any node that is assigned to nature. There is no single way to proceed in general from a normal form game to a corresponding extensive form game. In one obvious extensive form, the players all choose complete strategies simultaneously, but often other extensive forms could be constructed from a given normal form.

Games

Games are a unique art form. Game designers don’t just create a world; they create who you will be in that world. They tell you what abilities to use and what goals to take on. In other words, games work in the medium of agency. This book explores what games have to teach us about our own rationality and agency. We have the capacity for a peculiar sort of motivational inversion. For some of us, winning is not the point. We take on an interest in winning temporarily, so that we can play the game. Thus, we are capable of taking on temporary and disposable ends. At the center of this book is a view about games as communicative artifacts. Games are a way of recording forms of agency; they are a library of agencies. And exploring that library can help us develop our own agency and autonomy. But this technology can also be used for art. Games can sculpt our practical activity, for the sake of the beauty of our own actions. Our struggles, in games, can be designed to fit our capacities. Games can present a harmonious world, where our abilities fit the task. Games are a kind of existential balm against the difficult and exhausting value clarity of the world. But this presents a special danger. Games can be a fantasy of value clarity, which can encourage us to oversimplify our enduring values.