Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Mental Causation and the Mind-Body Problem

Inquiry ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Martin Hansen
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Hard Place

scholarly journals Can Neuroscientists Test a New Physicalist Mind/Body View: DiCoToP (Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism)?

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Interdisciplinary Research ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Multiple Realization ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Token Physicalism ◽  
The Mind

Given that disparate mind/body views have interfered with interdisciplinary research in psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the mind/body problem itself is explored here. Adding a philosophy of mind framework, problems for both dualists and physicalists are presented, along with essential concepts including: independent mental causation, emergence, and multiple realization. To address some of these issues in a new light, this article advances an original mind/body account—Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP). Next, puzzles DiCoTop reveals, psychoanalytic problems it solves, and some empirical evidence accrued for views consistent with DiCoToP are presented. In closing, this piece challenges/appeals for neuroscience research to gain evidence for (or against) the DiCoToP view.

Il problema mente-corpo nel dibattito contemporaneo

PARADIGMI ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 123-132
Author(s):  
Erica Cosentino
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Causal Efficacy ◽  
Crucial Question ◽  
Nonreductive Materialism ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Physical Causation

- The mind-body problem is a crucial question to philosophers and cognitive scientists who pursue a program of naturalization of mind while preserving its causal efficacy. Two options seem to be open if we approach the question from a materialistic point of view: either preserve the notion of mental autonomy, by adhering to a nonreductive materialism, or give up that notion by supporting a reductive option. What I propose for discussion here is a neo-reductive perspective which considers mental causation as a sort of physical causation and maintains the mind-body identity.Keywords: Mental causation, Physicalism, Supervenience, Epiphenomenalism, Qualia, Identity theory.Parole chiave: Causalitŕ mentale, Materialismo, Sopravvenienza, Epifenomenalismo, Qualia, Teoria dell'identitŕ psico-fisica.

The Mind-Body Problem Revisited

1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 660-660
Author(s):  
MADGE SCHEIBEL ◽  
ARNOLD SCHEIBEL
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

Brute Necessity and the Mind–Body Problem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.

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