Il problema mente-corpo nel dibattito contemporaneo

PARADIGMI ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 123-132
Author(s):  
Erica Cosentino
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Causal Efficacy ◽  
Crucial Question ◽  
Nonreductive Materialism ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Physical Causation

- The mind-body problem is a crucial question to philosophers and cognitive scientists who pursue a program of naturalization of mind while preserving its causal efficacy. Two options seem to be open if we approach the question from a materialistic point of view: either preserve the notion of mental autonomy, by adhering to a nonreductive materialism, or give up that notion by supporting a reductive option. What I propose for discussion here is a neo-reductive perspective which considers mental causation as a sort of physical causation and maintains the mind-body identity.Keywords: Mental causation, Physicalism, Supervenience, Epiphenomenalism, Qualia, Identity theory.Parole chiave: Causalitŕ mentale, Materialismo, Sopravvenienza, Epifenomenalismo, Qualia, Teoria dell'identitŕ psico-fisica.

scholarly journals Can Neuroscientists Test a New Physicalist Mind/Body View: DiCoToP (Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism)?

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Interdisciplinary Research ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Multiple Realization ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Token Physicalism ◽  
The Mind

Given that disparate mind/body views have interfered with interdisciplinary research in psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the mind/body problem itself is explored here. Adding a philosophy of mind framework, problems for both dualists and physicalists are presented, along with essential concepts including: independent mental causation, emergence, and multiple realization. To address some of these issues in a new light, this article advances an original mind/body account—Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP). Next, puzzles DiCoTop reveals, psychoanalytic problems it solves, and some empirical evidence accrued for views consistent with DiCoToP are presented. In closing, this piece challenges/appeals for neuroscience research to gain evidence for (or against) the DiCoToP view.

scholarly journals [MIND AND BRAIN IN PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCES]

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandro Nannini
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Brain Dynamics ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

[After a brief review of the solutions given to the mind-body problem by philosophers I propose a naturalistic-materialistic solution that is based on a collaboration between the philosophy of mind and neurosciences. According to this solution the three fundamental characteristics of every human state of consciousness – that is, having a content and being conscious and self-conscious - are identified with three higher order properties of brain dynamics from an ontological point of view, although each of them can be described and explained in the language of neuroscience, cognitive psychology and folk-psychology.]

Emergence and the Mind-Body Problem in Roger Sperry’s Studies

KronoScope ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rémy Lestienne
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Peripheral Nerves ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Downward Causation ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Scientific Career ◽  
Scientific Philosophy ◽  
The Central Nervous System ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Roger Sperry’s scientific career from his beginnings at Oberlin College in 1934 to his Nobel Prize in 1981 and his death in 1994 is examined from the point of view of the interaction between his scientific works and the evolution of his scientific philosophy. A progressive disengagement from the initial ambience of a reductionist and behaviorist attitude and a move toward the elaboration of an emergentist view of the mind-body problem is observed. This evolution is based on observations on the global and resistant properties of the central nervous system in animals in which the architecture of peripheral nerves has been surgically modified, on reflections on qualia (subjective global experiences such as that of pain). It follows many detailed observations of patients whose two cerebral hemispheres have been surgically disconnected for medical reasons, and in whom both the cognitive abilities of each separated cortical hemisphere and the unity of consciousness persist. Sperry’s resultant emergentist philosophy is paradigmatic of the strong form of emergence: not only is the global mind more than the sum of its parts, but in consciousness has a definite, downward causation power on subsequent and subjacent neural process. This view may be logically defendable only in a diachronic view of emergence, well in phase with a possible emergentist view of Time itself.

Pre-Copernican Stance in Neuroscience and Philosophy: Vantage Point from within Mind or Brain

2018 ◽  
pp. 377-402
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Our intuition pulls us towards assuming the mind. We are therefore inclined to approach the question for the existence and reality of mental features in terms of mind and mind-body problem rather than the world-brain problem (even if the latter is more plausible). The present chapter focuses on the origin of our “intuition of mind”. I argue that our “intuition of mind” is closely related to the vantage point or point of view we presuppose – the vantage point determines or frames the possible epistemic options that are included within the “logical space of knowledge”. Specifically, I argue that a “vantage point from within mind” makes possible to include the “intuition of mind” as possible epistemic option in our “logical space of knowledge”. However, such “vantage point from within mind” as well as its various escape strategies including vantage point from within reason and vantage point from brain or body amount to a pre-Copernican stance as they can be compared to the “vantage point from within earth” (chapter 12). My main argument in the present chapter is therefore that, analogous to Copernicus, we need to replace the pre-Copernican “vantage point from within mind” (or from within brain) by a post-Copernican “vantage point from beyond brain” – the latter will be developed in the next chapter.

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