Problem versus benefit focus: phrasing questions to enhance self-referencing and persuasion

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (17-18) ◽  
pp. 1689-1709 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsuan-Hsuan Ku ◽  
Chung-Yi Huang ◽  
Zu-Rong Shen
Keyword(s):  
1984 ◽  
Vol s2-30 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. W. Glass ◽  
James J. Madden

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (7) ◽  
pp. 159
Author(s):  
M. Rahim Bohlooli Niri

<p>The purpose of the present study is to investigate the relationship between successful readers’ strategies in Persian and English languages, and the impact of instruction of such strategies on English reading comprehension ability. The present study relies on Casanave’s (1998) expanded view of schema theory, the strategy schema, Goodman’s (1971) language transfer or linguistic independent hypothesis and Clarke’s idea of short-circuit or language ceiling hypothesis in ESL or EFL. This study also aims at finding an answer to the question of reading problem versus language problem, first raised by Alderson (1984, pp. 1-27) and then followed by Carrell (1991, pp. 159-179).</p>


1996 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Wahler ◽  
Marc E. Castellani ◽  
Greta D. Smith ◽  
Elizabeth A. Keathley

2012 ◽  
Vol 865 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei L. Lukyanov

Author(s):  
F. M. Kamm

This chapter concerns Derek Parfit’s discussion in his On What Matters, volume 3 of the irrelevance of deontological distinctions. Parfit begins by expressing his concern that morality will be undermined because practical reason, which tells us all things considered what to do, will often conflict with what we consider to be morally right. Unlike Sidgwick, Parfit does not begin by identifying morality with a part of impartial practical reason but rather with what he considers common sense deontology. Also, unlike Sidgwick, he thinks it is clear that sometimes self-interest (which provides some reason even impartially considered) is overridden by (other) impartial practical reasons (e.g., there is decisive reason to give one’s penny to save millions of other people). This chapter first considers how Parfit thinks one’s practical reason should reconcile concerns about self-sacrifice, pursuing the greater good, and morality. It then considers his use of case-based reasoning to undermine moral principles embodying such distinctions as harming versus not aiding, harming as a mere means versus as a side effect, and redirecting threats (as in the Trolley Problem) versus starting new ones.


2000 ◽  
Vol 168 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone M. Bruschi ◽  
Alexandre N. Carvalho ◽  
José G. Ruas-Filho

1998 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 409-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan W Cockeram

Dysphagia may be defined as difficulty in swallowing. Dysphagia may be classified as oropharyngeal or esophageal; oropharyngeal dysphagia arises from a structural or functional abnormality in the oropharynx, and esophageal dysphagia occurs as a result of structural or functional abnormalities in the esophagus. Esophageal dysphagia may be further subclassified symptomatically as dysphagia for solids alone, which usually suggests a mechanical problem, versus dysphagia for liquids and solids, which is more suggestive of a neuromuscular problem. Dysphagia may be described by the patient as a sensation of food 'sticking' or as a sensation of food passing slowly through the esophagus. True dysphagia always indicates organic disease and always warrants investigation and consultation if no cause is found in initial studies. These symptoms should be distinguished from those of a persistent foreign body-type sensation or a sensation of a lump, which is more typical of globus sensation. Odynophagia, defined as pain with swallowing, may occur in association with esophageal dysmotility or as a result of mucosal disease in the esophagus.


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