Ambiguity, Economic Interdependence, and the US Strategic Dilemma in the Taiwan Strait

2006 ◽  
Vol 15 (49) ◽  
pp. 651-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott L. Kastner
2020 ◽  
pp. 66-100
Author(s):  
Bhubhindar Singh

The chapter shows how the Japanese security policymaking elite utilised the North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 1993–4, the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 and the Taepodong Crisis in 1999 to authorise the SDF to adopt a regional defence role within the US–Japan alliance.


2019 ◽  
pp. 9-47
Author(s):  
Pang Yang Huei

The genesis of the Taiwan Straits Crises could be traced to 1950 when President Harry S. Truman positioned the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities between the PRC and the ROC. In order to understand the origins and making of the contest over control of the Taiwan Strait, it is important to deal with the major developments in the foreign relations of the US, PRC and ROC from 1950 to April 1954. As the ROC was the most directly affected party right from the start, how the Taiwan Strait issue played out in Taiwan will also be examined.


2019 ◽  
pp. 116-153
Author(s):  
Pang Yang Huei

On 18 January 1955, the PRC upped the ante by recovering the obscure Nationalist-controlled Yijiangshan islands as a prelude to occupying the neighboring Dachen islands. In a news conference on 16 March, Eisenhower publicly threatened the use of nuclear weapons. At the first Afro-Asian Conference held on 18-24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, PRC premier Zhou Enlai announced that China was not averse to negotiating with the US over the Taiwan Strait. Zhou’s conciliatory gesture was quickly accepted by the US over virulent protests by the ROC. This chapter explores the motivations for the actions of China, the US and Taiwan. It further explicates on the development of Sino-US relations from the eve of the Yijiangshan campaign to the Bandung Conference.


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