The Land of Hope: Border, Evacuation, and Rejection During a Nuclear Crisis

Film review of Land of Hope (2012)

Detecting Post-Nuclear Crisis in Hanna Jameson’s The Last

Hanna Jameson’s post-apocalyptic detective novel, The Last (2019), addresses contemporary issues that affect us on both a collective and an individual level. The author diagnoses the denial of nuclearism and calls for an awareness of the nuclear age combined with the looming threat of climate change. The novel negotiates alternative strategies for the treatment of crisis brought about by the nuclear attack and borrows many of the thematic and structural elements from twentieth-century nuclear fictions in which the apocalypse is not necessarily regarded in negative terms but as a chance for regeneration. The events of the post-nuclear months in a Swiss hotel are narrated by an American historian whose written account serves several goals. It gives the illusion of delaying crisis, but it also reveals his fears and traumas conjured up by radioactive spectres. There are two different types of narratives at work, the narrative of the crisis and that of the investigation. The narrator-protagonist becomes obsessed with finding the solution to a murder mystery, which in a metaphorical sense is to give a soothing answer to the death of millions. However, this attempt keeps failing, and thus the narrative of the crisis devours all kinds of rational initiatives to resolve chaos. In order to elaborate on the psychological impact of the post-nuclear crisis in subject construction, I do not only examine the character of the amateur detective of the whodunit whose intervention aims to restore order, but I also apply Gabriele Schwab’s concepts of post-nuclear subjectivity and nuclear hauntology.

“The Courtroom of World Opinion”: Bringing the International Audience into Nuclear Crises

What role does the international audience play in nuclear crises? Scholars of nuclear crises and deterrence have treated nuclear crises as dyadic interactions between two sides. However, states do not only interact with each other during a nuclear crisis. They also signal to a third actor—the international audience. There are two reasons for this. First, states care about their international social reputation and want to be perceived as responsible and legitimate actors. Second, there are material benefits to states maintaining a good social reputation with the international audience, which possesses the leverage to reward, condemn, and sanction. States thus attempt to leverage this power of the international audience to apply diplomatic pressure on their adversary during nuclear crises. They also engage in costly signaling and strategic restraint to ensure that the international audience considers their actions legitimate during the crisis. I use original qualitative evidence from the Kargil War (1999) between India and Pakistan to demonstrate this dynamic. Incorporating the international audience as a critical third actor during nuclear crises has important academic and policy implications for the study of nuclear crises and their management. ¿Qué función cumple el público internacional en las crisis nucleares? Los estudiosos de la disuasión y las crisis nucleares han tratado dichas crisis como interacciones diádicas entre dos lados. No obstante, los Estados no solo interactúan entre sí durante una crisis nuclear. También hacen señas a un tercer actor: el público internacional. Esto se debe a dos motivos. En primer lugar, los Estados se preocupan por su reputación social internacional y desean que se los perciba como actores responsables y legítimos. En segundo lugar, existen beneficios materiales para los Estados que mantienen una buena reputación social con el público internacional, el cual tiene influencia en la recompensación, la condena y la sanción. Por tanto, los Estados intentan aprovechar este poder del público internacional para aplicar presión diplomática en su adversario durante las crisis nucleares. También emplean un envío de señas costoso y restricciones estratégicas para garantizar que el público internacional considere sus acciones como legítimas durante la crisis. Utilizo pruebas cualitativas originales de la guerra de Kargil (1999) entre India y Pakistán para demostrar esta dinámica. La incorporación del público internacional como un tercer actor fundamental durante las crisis nucleares presenta importantes implicaciones académicas y políticas para el estudio de las crisis nucleares y su manejo. Quel rôle le public international joue-t-il dans les crises nucléaires? Les chercheurs se consacrant à la dissuasion et aux crises nucléaires ont traité les crises nucléaires comme étant des interactions dyadiques entre deux camps. Cependant, les États ne se contentent pas d'interagir l'un avec l'autre lors d'une crise nucléaire. Ils émettent également un signal à l'attention d'un acteur tiers, le public international. Il y a deux raisons à cela. D'une part, les États se soucient de leur réputation sociale internationale et souhaitent être perçus comme des acteurs responsables et légitimes. Et d'autre part, le maintien d'une bonne réputation sociale auprès du public international présente des avantages matériels pour les États puisque ce public dispose de l'influence nécessaire pour récompenser, condamner et sanctionner. Les États tentent donc de tirer parti de ce pouvoir du public international pour exercer une pression diplomatique sur leur adversaire lors de crises nucléaires. Ils s'engagent également dans un signal coûteux et dans une retenue stratégique pour veiller à ce que le public international considère leurs actions comme légitimes durant la crise. Je m'appuie sur des preuves qualitatives originales issues du conflit de Kargil (1999) entre l'Inde et le Pakistan pour démontrer cette dynamique. L'intégration du public international comme troisième acteur essentiel lors de crises nucléaires a d'importantes implications politiques et de recherche pour l’étude des crises nucléaires et de leur gestion.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN RESOLVING THE FIRST NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

The article examines the relationship between the United States and the DPRK during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. It discusses the events leading up to the crisis and the behavior of both sides and international organizations before and during the crisis. The article draws up the role of South Korea during the escalation of the crisis, as well as influence of other countries interested in resolving the crisis. It analyzes the U.S.-North Korea relationship and the impact of the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the international situation at that time. In this aspect, the study of the Korean nuclear program and the role of the United States has not previously been carried out in Russian historiography. The discussion leads to the design and stages of the KEDO creation with attention to the documents on this international consortium. The situation demonstrates different visions on the USA foreign policy strategy chosen in relation to the DPRK nuclear problem in 1990s, namely the opinion of the United States diplomats working on relations with the DPRK, and American researchers in humanities and technology. The paper concludes with the reasons of the Framework Agreements’ failure that led to the crises.

Conceptual foundations of Japan’s modern energy policy: a post-crisis paradigm shift

The article deals with the modern energy policy of Japan. The main analysis is devoted to the transformation of the Japanese energy development strategy after two large-scale energy crises in the country’s recent history — the "oil shocks" of the 1970s and the "nuclear crisis" of 2011. These crises initially occurred in diff erent sectors of energy and one had an external character (was provoked by the actions of Gulf countries) and internal (man-made accidents in Japan), but they both exposed the vulnerability of the structure of the Japanese fuel and energy crisis and demanded rethinking and transformation of energy policy. The article examines the extent to which Japan has managed to formulate and implement new eff ective approaches to overcome the energy crisis that has arisen since 2011. and caused by internal causes (endogenous factors), and the modernization of the national fuel and energy complex, in comparison with the anti-crisis measures taken in the fi eld of energy policy transformation after the energy crisis of the 1970s, caused by exogenous causes. For this purpose, the offi cial strategic plans for the development of energy in Japan are analyzed, starting from 2010 and up to the current plan for 2018. The article also examines the offi cial government plans for the technological development of the country’s energy sector up to 2050. The author attempts to track how the attitude to the use of nuclear power generation changed after 2011 in Japan and why it was still decided not to abandon it. The role of renewable energy sources in achieving these goals is analyzed. In the article, the author focuses on how, after the energy crises of the 1970s and 2011, approaches to the interpretation of the concept of national energy security. changed in Japan.